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reaching reveals, amongst other things, the state of the heart
of the church – whether it be healthy or ailing. Sermons from
the South African apartheid era, taken from the official mouthpiece
of the Dutch Reformed Church (Die Kerkbode), as preached during the
years 1960 to 1980 reveal a church sickened by an ideology that had
a devastating effect on the country as a whole. In this book, these
sermons are analyzed in depth, following a method of “close reading”
that not only takes the linguistic detail of each sermon very seriously,
but also the theological perspectives conveyed by these details. These
analyses bring to light the way preachers made use of biblical texts to
sanction national ideals, to create and perpetuate selective God-images,
and to stabilize a certain identity during a time of crises. It is saddening
and shocking to read and relive these sermons, even after 12 years of
democracy in South Africa. But it must not be erased from our memory
too quickly. The church cannot do without remembrance. It watches
over the state of her heart.
Johan Cilliers has written more than 30 books, seven of which are in
the academic field of practical theology – dealing, amongst other things,
with issues such as homiletics and ethics; liturgy and aesthetics; and
basic principles of preaching. He has ministered for 18 years in
congregations in South Africa and currently is associate professor in
Homiletics and Liturgy at the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosch
University in South Africa.
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PREFACE 1 (1994) 
The great Reformer, Martin Luther, said that preaching is about the cor ecclesiae, 
the heart of the church - thus, about the heart of preaching, about the heart of the 
life of faith, as well as that of the congregation. Because, Luther says, preaching is 
about the heart of the Gospel: the message of salvation, of the justification of 
sinners. Preaching lives by this, the church lives by this, and Luther also lives by 
this. 
Preaching touches the heart of the church, because it concerns the heart of Scrip-
ture, yes, the very heart of God. Preaching listens to God’s voice (Calvin), where it 
hears the language of love, of God’s compassion with a world in need. Preaching 
follows in God’s footsteps (Luther), it follows the movement of his love in Jesus 
Christ and the movement of his care in the Holy Spirit. Preaching gives an insight 
into God’s heart. 
Preaching also provides an insight into the preacher’s theology – above all, how-
ever, into the preacher’s heart, into his/her loyalties, preferences and motives…. 
In preaching, the most profound secrets of the preacher’s heart are revealed (cf. 
Lk 2:35), of his or her insight into the Word, into the Gospel, into the heart of 
God. “The heart is deceitful above all things…” (Jer 17:9) – also a minister’s heart. 
Preaching reveals ministers’ hearts, also their pretences, illusions and deceit. 
After all, ministers speak much about the Gospel, even much about God…. But: 
what type of Gospel, what type of God? A man-made God, a God made in the 
image and resemblance of the preacher. How true, how appallingly true! 
This unnerves anyone who preaches, especially after one has read this moving 
and heart-rending work of Johan Cilliers: the result of an in-depth analysis of the 
under-ground, the ideological foundation - one could say the heart – of a number 
of sermons that were published in Die Kerkbode.1 They were heart-rending, as 
these sermons were published for all to read. Heart-rending, when one considers 
the opinion-making influence of all sermons, also how such sermons have 
                                                 
1 The official mouthpiece of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa. 
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legitimized and perpetuated attitudes, values and actions…. Heart-rending, when 
one reads what such sermons about God have done with the Gospel, with God’s 
heart, yes, with God Himself. Sermons that affected the church’s heart, wounded 
it, hurt it …. 
One is grateful that Johan Cilliers, together with an internationally renowned 
research team in Germany, introduced sermon analysis as a new homiletical 
genre to the South African research community. In the light of history, amongst 
other things, we must learn to preach, learn how we preached, what we must still 
learn and what we must unlearn. Through such empirical and rhetorical analysis, 
this research must continue, and also monitor the preaching in a new 
dispensation. 
One is especially grateful that the author did not write only from his head, but 
especially from his heart. That, through this, he has addressed all preachers, yes 
also himself – called them to grieve profoundly over such sermons. To guide the 
church as ministers. To lead the church. I want to start with myself. I was also a 
minister when these sermons were preached. I heard such sermons. Perhaps, 
through the grace of God, I did not preach quite like that. But I want to confess 
that, on hearing such sermons, I did not protest loudly, did not protest against the 
wounding of the heart of the church, the heart of preaching, the heart of God. 
“What a wretched man I am!” (Rom 7:24). Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa! 
This reminds me of Martin Niemöller’s 1947 confession in Treysa: “We became 
tired of protesting when we feared humans more than the living God. Therefore, 
the catastrophe broke loose over all of us and dragged us along in its rapid pace. 
But we, the church, must beat our breasts and confess: I am guilty; it is my guilt, 
my enormous guilt.” 
PROF. BETHEL MÜLLER 
Stellenbosch 1994 
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PREFACE 2 (2005) 
South Africa has entered the second decade of its first experience of democracy. 
Now South Africans have a further opportunity to look at each other over the 
demolished dividing walls of apartheid and, daily, to learn new aspects about each 
other. In the shining eyes of many there are signs of being amazed by each other, 
but also a shadow of concern about our future lives together. But deep in our 
hearts we embrace the promise of a better tomorrow for all. 
Yet we know that no person can remember the promises for tomorrow without 
the capacity to recall the realities of yesterday. You cannot remember and cherish 
these promises, if you wish to forget the roots of the past from which these 
promises germinated. 
This book by Johan Cilliers is one of the writings that help us to call into 
remembrance, and in doing so, to once again grieve for change. Here we see what 
disgraceful views about God and the volk (the people) formed the religio-
ideological substructure of dominant sermons that were published in the official 
mouthpiece of the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) during the period 1960 to 
1980. It is important to be reminded of this, before we all acquire new ideological 
tricks. It will be to our collective benefit, in South Africa as well as abroad, if we 
learn from these analyses that our dream of unity in the church and nation must 
be uprooted from this ecclesiastical guilt, and that a new implantation is essential 
for the growth of the tree of God’s promises for South Africa.  
The title of this book identifies the core question: God for us? The question mark 
plays an important role in this book. 
The only true stumbling block for church unity in the DRC family is the 
continuous existence of this question mark between the DRC and the Uniting 
Reformed Church. Here lies the great challenge of the second decade of 
democracy for these churches. The present crisis is best represented in the so-
called Belhar debate. The misunderstanding of the pro-nobis principle (God for 
us) is the heart of the separation of Christians in this family of churches. The 
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roots of this phenomenon, this misunderstanding, have never been better 
embodied than in this book by Johan Cilliers. Here the analysis of the sermons 
testifies to the actual historical reason why the DRC cannot accept the Belhar 
Confession. Ultimately, everything hinges on our view concerning the question: 
God for us? The hermeneutics of Belhar are in stark contrast to the hermeneutics 
revealed in this research done by Johan Cilliers. Belhar maintains that the “us” in 
this “God-for-us” principle must not be equated with the volk, the local 
congregation, the denomination or view of the majority. The “we” that God 
wishes to create is the “we” together with the “others.” However, the others are 
not others by our own choice. They are the suffering, the marginalized and 
excluded others. 
Hopefully, this book will help its readers to understand that God does not choose 
like human beings do. He goes further by calling every believer to participate in 
this strange way of choosing, contra human inclinations. Choose against yourself; 
that is, choose like God does. His question is never: “What is in it for me?” No, 
God’s “for you” is for you, as the other person, an improbable, marginalized 
person, but also one who has tasted God’s grace. Our national economic 
condition (the poor), the gender opportunities (for women), issues of sexual 
orientation and separation of classes confront us with this divine choice. 
Naturally, we make these kinds of choices privately and in our non-religious 
calculations. 
However, there are none as unwise as those who think that God cannot 
comprehend the correlation between our statistics and our belief or sermons! 
This was the fault of some ministers during the apartheid years. Will we do better 
in future decades…? 
PROF. RUSSEL BOTMAN 
Vice-Rector (Education) University of Stellenbosch 
President of the South African Council of Churches 
Stellenbosch, 2005 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
God for us. These three words summarise the core of the Gospel, as a salvific fact, 
consolation and promise. God’s existence is existence for us, and our existence is 
existence through, and before, Him. Paul confesses this inclusively: God is for us 
(Rm 8:31), for Jew and non-Jew, without preferences or boundaries, for humans. 
In fact, the Gospel reveals that God vindicates humans of their sins, not on the 
basis of their abilities or virtue, but solely because they believe (Rm 1:16,17). 
Precisely because of this the Gospel is exclusive: then, “who can be against us?” 
(Rm 8:31). These words apply against everything that is against us, also against us, 
who are repeatedly against God. They apply even against God’s own opposition: 
through his wrath, God strives to reach us; in his judgement, He embraces us 
(Luther). Of this Paul is convinced, so convinced that, after his interpretation of 
the Gospel (Rm 1-8); he utters his cry of jubilation, and laughs his paschal laugh: 
God for us! 
In this pro nobis lies also the meaning and secret of preaching. After all, in the 
Reformed tradition there is no conviction that has so strong an influence on 
preaching as, indeed, the doctrine of justification (Josuttis 1966:12). The 
proclamation of God turning towards us in Christ, of exoneration of sin through 
the Name of Jesus, that is the Gospel, says Luther, and, in the light of this, he lays 
down a basic rule that has become basic for all Reformed preaching: nihil nisi 
Christus praedicandus (proclaim nothing but Christ). The content of Scripture 
and the preaching are, in fact, summarised by the Reformists as: the Gospel of 
Jesus Christ (cf. Jonker 1976:61). Without this Gospel, i.e. without the actual 
justification of sinners by God in Christ, the sermon (regardless of its verbosity or 
correctness) will be vapour and noise, an empty speech, a lie, religious “bla-bla” 
(Bohren 1974:33). 
GOD FOR US? 
 2
Within this basic Reformed framework, in this research I listened to 14 South 
African sermons and examined the nature of the declaration of justification and 
the character of the proclamation of the Gospel in each. Hopefully, this research 
will contribute towards an essential awareness-making process, namely of what 
happens in preaching when God is proclaimed as God-for-us – or not; it concerns 
the question: Do preachers actually mean what they say? And: Do they say what 
they mean? Often a few words, a single sentence, can negate the reassurance of 
the declaration of justification; often a mere change of “gears” of the biblical text 
sends the congregation home without the Gospel. In general, the preachers’ 
theology is not so much apparent from their explicit dogmatic declarations, but 
rather in their sermons’ spate of words, in their speech movement. They offer the 
highest degree of concreteness against which the preachers’ theology can be 
tested. The nature of the spirit that inspires the preacher and the sermon is 
apparent from the torrent of words from the pulpit (Bohren 1991:3). Here, in the 
sermon’s greater and smaller linguistic movement, much stands or falls, in fact 
everything!  
However, this process of being made aware must not be viewed as clinical 
censure. The intention is to teach. After all, preaching is something that must be 
learnt, must be learnt anew every time. Our inherent inclination is to oppose the 
Word, and to oppose God’s declaration of justification. We are for ourselves. All 
people, also preachers, are natural liars (Ps 116:11). While we want to do good – 
also viewed homiletically – we do evil (Rm 7:19). This does not happen 
purposefully. Our bona fides are normally in order. We do not have preconceived 
intentions to tell lies (Augustine: mendacium est enunciato cum voluntate falsum 
enuntiandi). Yet, we do it. We use our language, which in itself is good and which 
the Spirit assesses as the most profound art (Grane 1971:191), so that it serves the 
lie, and only a narrow passage of truth remains (Weinrich 1970:12). We betray 
the truth with our rhetoric. I say “we” and mean exactly this. I know what I’m 
speaking about. I speak as a preacher. 
Preaching must be learnt. The memory of history, as well as the history of 
preaching, is a teacher here. However, learning from this history is only 
meaningful if not merely the highlights, but also the preaching sins of yesterday, 
the shadows, are recognized and identified. In remembering this history of 
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preaching, we develop caution in proclamation and confidence in proclaiming for 
the future. Discourse with the preaching fathers and mothers inspires us (Bohren 
1981:48-69). However, this inspiration is preceded and is concomitant with 
confession. Unconfessed guilt is not like yesterday’s snow. It does not melt as a 
result of our forgetfulness, but threatens to smother us if we suppress it (Bohren 
in preface to Richter-Böhne 1989). Our guilt must be revealed and be called by 
name, be brought to consciousness and be preached, and this is no easy task. To 
remember selectively is in our blood. We grow up with unilateral images of our 
history, about ourselves. We suffer from a natural inability to grieve about our 
sins (cf. Mitscherlich’s 1967 study), including our homiletical sins against the 
congregation, and especially before God. Also, in this respect, this study wishes to 
be an awareness-maker, to promote self-insight, and to appeal for confession of 
guilt. 
In view of this, I limit myself to sermons from the Dutch Reformed Church 
(DRC) for the reasons set out below. 
~ The first reason is of an existential nature. I am a member – and was for 
many years a minister – of this Church.2 It is a well-known fact that, during 
the past number of years, the Dutch Reformed Church was called especially 
to confess its guilt for its theological support and promotion of the political 
system of apartheid. It has done so on a number of occasions, also formally 
during meetings of its General Synod.3 However, it still wrestles with this 
problem. For a variety of reasons there seem to be misunderstandings in this 
respect – underlined by the fact that even now, ten years after democracy, the 
Reformed Church Family is still struggling with the process of unifying. Some 
leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church still believe that the official synodical 
declarations and documents contain enough confessions and they blame 
other members of the Dutch Reformed family for being unforgiving and even 
appeal to them now to confess their guilt! It is clear that at least a part of the 
Dutch Reformed Church, particularly also members on grassroots level, do 
not understand the stance of the other members of the Reformed family. 
                                                 
2 The author is presently a lecturer in Homiletics and Liturgy at the Theological Faculty of 
Stellenbosch, South Africa. 
3 First in 1986, and again in 1990. 
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Possibly the Dutch Reformed Church does not realise how profoundly the 
other members of the family were affected by the system of apartheid; 
therefore they do not understand the need for a (continuous) confession of 
their guilt. Possibly some members of the family feel that the Dutch 
Reformed Church has not reached the true point in its confession. The issue 
of guilt, restitution and unity is a continuing debate at present in the South 
African church scene, and will probably remain so for years to come.4 
This research wishes to serve this discourse, wishes to provide contents for it 
from a homiletical perspective, and especially wishes to contribute to the 
content of the confession of guilt as such, a concept that runs the risk of 
remaining vague and academic. That the DRC has a reason for confession of 
guilt, in my opinion, is apparent from the analyses. The sermons at issue here 
demonstrate, beside all the positive things that one could say about them, 
and despite all the biblical and general Christian truths that they also contain, 
that here something happened with God Himself, that something was made 
with, and from Him that affects the heartbeat of the Gospel. How the DRC 
will deal with this fact will, in my opinion, greatly determine its future 
credibility. This is an issue that cannot be settled with a number of official 
declarations, but which must be worked through in continuous discussions in 
a process of questioning and listening, of remembrance and repetition, 
instead of forgetting and pushing aside (Richter-Böhne 1989:13). There can 
be no other route. 
~ The second reason for limiting myself to the DRC sermons is practical by 
nature. During my doctoral studies (“Soos woorde van God,” 1982) I 
analysed, inter alia, quite a number of “political” sermons that ultimately were 
not included in the dissertation, but which offered fascinating reading. I have 
extended this “bank of sermons” in this study and offer the broader 
background from which I made the selection of 14 sermons, an indication 
                                                 
4 The DRC and the URC (The Uniting Reformed Church in Southern Africa) are presently engaged 
in talks and conventions concerning unity. There are, however, still a number of unresolved issues, 
for example, the acceptance of the Belhar Confession by the DRC.  
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that the phenomena that I highlight here are not merely exceptions to the 
rule, but deserve further and incisive attention. 
~ The final reason is a matter of principle. Although one can accept with 
confidence that not only the DRC preached in this manner, and that the 
Hervormde and Reformed Churches5 also contributed to the creation of a 
specific viewpoint among members, the general acceptance is that the DRC 
was, and probably still is, the greatest and most influential Church among 
white South Africans. Thus, this Church represents an important 
“homiletical agent” and therefore also an important contributor to the 
present situation. 
In formal terms, the purpose of this study is to assess the hermeneutical method 
of sermons by means of rhetorical and theological criteria, in order to determine 
the processes that the preachers followed to articulate God as God-for-us (pro 
nobis). The sermons all are from the period 1960 to 1980, an era in South African 
history that, on the one hand, was still characterized by a post-war prosperity 
among a large part of the white population, and on the other hand, by growing 
relational problems and alienation among the various population groups. In this 
respect, the events at Sharpeville (1960) formed a type of watershed and focused 
the world’s attention on South Africa, with increasing foreign isolation, sanctions 
and internal unrest and violence. (For an extensive discussion, cf. Muller 
1980:510-520.) South Africa’s subsequent withdrawal from the Commonwealth 
(May 1961) led to its greatest economic crisis since the depression of 1930 to 
1932. A combination of political, economic and social factors resulted in 
experiences of anxiety amongst a section of especially the whites, who felt that 
their identity and continued existence was threatened. In many respects, it was a 
time of upheaval in which the “white” church wished to guide its members 
pastorally, also in their preaching. The sermons that are at issue here must be 
understood in this light as sermons that had the explicit or implicit intention to 
be relevant by uttering a timely word of reassurance for that troubled era. In a 
                                                 
5 Other churches within the Reformed Family, which either explicitly or implicitly advanced the 
notion of apartheid in South Africa. 
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sense, these sermons expressed the religious interpretation of the “people’s”6 state 
of emergency; they expressed a search for religious anchors, for consolation and 
thus could be called pastoral preaching to the people.  
Therefore, the broad coordinating system within which the sermons could be 
placed is the experience of threat and anxiety, on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, the intention to define theologically the “people’s” situation and, indeed, 
justify it, as the analyses indicate. The hermeneutical choices and short-circuiting 
that emanated from this threat are assessed with the help of linguistic and 
theological criteria.  
Thus, the theological tradition pertaining to the sermons are Reformed; in fact, all 
are from Die Kerkbode, the official paper of the DRC, but they in no way 
represent an exact image statistically of all preaching from this time. The research 
does not wish to say: this is typical of sermons in South Africa, or in Die 
Kerkbode, during these years. But it can indeed say: this is what was preached too. 
Naturally, there were also other voices that expressed the “people’s situation” 
completely differently.7 There were also sermons – perhaps the majority – that 
made no mention of the situation. Yet it is significant that this period’s “threat” 
was expressed particularly strongly in the analyzed sermons, and that the fear and 
uncertainty attained an unmistakably urgent character. Here there are clear signs 
that the old traditions have come under attack as never before, that they indeed 
were beginning to crumble. These factors played a decisive role as norm for the 
selection of the sermons, in the sense that sermons were selected that strongly 
addressed the above-named two poles, i.e. the external threat, on the one hand, 
and religious “solutions”, on the other. The number of sermons that ultimately 
were included in the study is incidental. I may mention that, interestingly, among 
                                                 
6 The Afrikaans word “volk” is a key concept in these sermons. “Volk” could be translated as “people” 
or “nation”, but implicitly referred to the white Afrikaner as an ethnic group.  
7 One need only mention the prophetic ministry of Beyers Naudé – to name but one – who grew up 
in the typical Afrikaner establishment, but soon realised that the system of apartheid was biblically 
and morally unjustifiable, and protested against it in his preaching, declarations and actions. 
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the 14 sermons, two were held on the Day of the Covenant,8 one was a message at 
the celebration of Republic Day, one was given as opening address of a General 
Synod of the DRC, and two were New Year’s Eve/New Year’s Day sermons. The 
Afrikaans sermons were translated into English in order to introduce this genre of 
preaching to a wider audience. The translation strives to retain the original 
grammatical structures and idiomatic expressions as far as possible. 
One could rightly accept that this genre of preaching exercised a significant 
influence on the viewpoint, not only of local congregations, but also on the 
broader population among whom the DRC worked. The role of the preaching, as 
opinion-maker, must be neither over- nor under-estimated, especially as regards 
the legitimizing and perpetuation of existing religious and social profiles. The 
preaching was often merely a mirror image of the community that it served 
(Müller 1987:43-44). The young democracy of South Africa, which is 
characterized by transition – and thus uncertainty – does not come out of a 
vacuum. It was preceded by traditions that, inter alia, were also protected by this 
preaching, but are now being replaced by new ones. However, old traditions die 
slowly. The after-effects of the preaching of the years 1960 to 1980 are still 
perceptible; the present South Africa is also its fruit. To a certain extent the 
sermons, with their strong protest against change, which sometimes borders on 
the creation of an apocalyptic mood, express the first birth pains of a community 
in transition, and illustrate the escalation of disillusionment with the order then 
prevailing. 
Therefore, although the sermons deal with various biblical texts, it is not 
surprising that the hermeneutically determined foundation is precisely identical, 
with a few exceptions. A single glance at the choice of texts of the sermons 
confirms this: texts in which times of crises were reflected, mainly Old Testament 
texts in which the political and theological viewpoints of the Israelites were 
connected, enjoyed preference, as they most effectively facilitated the association 
between the nation’s situation and religious interpretation (cf. Pressel 1967:40-
                                                 
8 A religious festival upheld by a section of the Afrikaner people, celebrating their forefather’s victory 
on the battlefield against all odds against the Zulu people. God was given the honour for this and a 
covenant made to celebrate this day as a Sabbath. Currently it is a public holiday known as The Day 
of Reconciliation (16 December). 
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41). The sermons also often express concern about the youth, who had to 
maintain the traditions and thus be anchored in the old order. All new influences 
had to be kept from them. Conservatism was to be preserved at all cost. 
This structure, in which all the elements are actually interwoven and confirm 
each other, forms a close unity in all the sermons. The reader could probably also 
recognize a similar structure in other periods and in other sermons of this kind. 
In fact, it is possible that we are not dealing here with a specifically Dutch 
Reformed or South African phenomenon. Situations of anxiety in which ministers 
and their congregations find themselves may differ from time to time, may 
present totally other features, but the hermeneutical way that is followed to 
conquer anxiety is stereotypical.9 The basis of these 14 sermons, preached 
between 1960 and 1980, offers a grasp on a wider phenomenon. 
In the research I used the analytical method that the theologian, Rudolf Bohren, 
and the German author, Gerd Debus, developed at the University of Heidelberg 
in Germany (summarized briefly in Bohren 1989:55-61). This method gained 
international recognition at a symposium on preaching research that was held 
from 8 to 12 September 1986 in Heidelberg. To my knowledge, this is the first 
time that the method has been applied in this way to South African sermons. It 
developed from the close reading of literally thousands of sermons and takes as its 
point of departure the right and power of a congregation (as ecclesia completa) to 
corroborate critically the preaching taking place in its midst. The objective is for 
the method to act as an aid for this congregational assessment of preaching (cf. 
Cilliers 1992:383-389).  
The Ecumenical Association for the Promotion of Preaching is refining this 
method continuously. It has its seat in Heidelberg and has a sermon bank of over 
20 000 sermons from a broad spectrum of theological and ecclesiastical 
confessions from, inter alia, World War II as well as the post-war period, when 
issues such as guilt and restitution had to be dealt with. Thus, it is a method that 
grew from a sensitivity to the history of preaching, but also a passion to move 
closer to the practice of preaching, and as such it represents an integrated 
                                                 
9 For example, a study on the way congregations and churches are presently dealing with different 
forms of anxiety in the young democracy of South Africa would be illuminating. 
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practical theology in its own right. However, as a methodology it does not want to 
be an objective in itself. It wants to contribute to the theological and empirical 
evaluation of preaching and to be used to supplement methods that place a 
greater emphasis on an investigation into the communicative working of 
preaching (cf. Pieterse 1991 for an extensive bibliography). 
In co-operation with the Association, these sermons were analysed during ten 
meetings. The analytical team was comprised of theologians and ministers of the 
Lutheran Evangelical and Roman Catholic Churches, as well as a number of 
doctoral students and lay preachers. The most important findings of these 
sessions, as well as many personal discussions with members of the Association, 
are reflected briefly here and thus offer a broader, ecumenical vision on this 
specific form of preaching (cf, also Chapter 5 on the ecumene). 
Formally, the methodology consists of a number of analytical and synthesising 
steps. On the one hand, the text of the sermon is examined in extenso - its con-
tent is investigated linguistically (regarding words, sentences, paragraphs) so that 
the superficial structure becomes clear. On the other hand, the mutual relations 
between the linguistic contents are determined in order to allow the basic 
motives of the sermon to be revealed. These motives together form the depth 
structure of the sermon. 
Here I use the terms “superficial structure” and “depth structure” as they have 
become part and parcel of the terminology of the Ecumenical Association. These 
terms have a particular linguistic content and definition, and appear as such in 
discourse analysis. Here, the issue dealt with is the difference between the explicit 
and implicit use of language, which offers the possibility to critically interpret the 
sermons ideologically. Research has shown that the formation of ideologies takes 
place at various levels. The level of depth, which Faye (1977:142) calls the real 
intentions and interests of the ideology, mostly determines the surface of the 
discourse, which can include matters such as reports, ideas, propaganda, 
promises, rhetoric, etc. To serve these intentions and interests, ideology needs 
instruments of power and it is especially the power of language that is mobilized 
in this respect. Ideology is the use of meaning (thus language) in service of power 
(Thompson 1984:131-132). Therefore, the study of ideology is synonymous with 
the study of the ways in which language is applied to sanction the relations of 
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domination, and it is the task of ideological criticism to point out the other 
possibilities of language, i.e. to break through the existing reality of language 
being used as an instrument of power, to relativize the existing power relations 
and to propose new realities. In fact, ideological criticism not only points out this 
possibility, but already demonstrates it (Thompson 1984:131). Thompson 
distinguishes three ways in particular in which ideology operates in, and through, 
language: firstly, by presenting the relation of domination as legitimate. Every 
system of domination tries to build faith in its legitimacy by an appeal to either 
rational, traditional or charismatic grounds - an appeal that is normally expressed 
in language. The second is by way of dissimulation. Relations of domination that 
serve the interests of some to the detriment of others are hidden, denied or 
blocked in various ways. These processes, which often overlap and seldom take 
place deliberately, conceal themselves by presenting themselves in a number of 
ways that are implemented to hide their true nature. The third method is by way 
of perpetuation, i.e. by changing a transient, historical situation into a permanent, 
natural, non-temporary premise. According to Thompson (1984:131), the role of 
ideology possibly lies especially in this: to (frequently) reconfirm the idea of a 
community “without a history” in the centre of the historical society. 
According to Thompson (1984:131-132), these three linguistic modi operandi of 
ideology formation are not necessarily the only ones that figure in a given 
situation, and they are also not mutually exclusive. By way of theoretical and 
empirical analyses, the unique interplay of these and other factors must be 
discovered in each situation. All this requires an intensive work with language 
itself. On this, Kress and Hodge (1988) did pioneer work in their search on the 
social dimensions of semiotics. According to them, semiotics has a social function 
in the sense that it offers characteristics according to which the identity and 
cohesion of a group, as well as the distinction from other groups, are illustrated 
and promoted. These signs (Hodge & Kress also call them metasigns) thus 
express a specific view of social relations and continuously monitor these 
relations of the “semiotic group.” Hodge & Kress distinguish a whole constella-
tion of metasigns that have definitive social, and therefore ideological, functions 
(1988:78-120). 
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The Heidelberg method of sermon analysis seeks to reveal the explicit and 
implicit signs of language in sermons. It meticulously notes finer speech signals, 
for example:  
~ the introductory sentence(s), because they mostly determine the course of the 
sermon;  
~ the conclusion, because this indicates how the expectations raised in the first 
sentence(s) are fulfilled;  
~ the way in which words in the building up of the sermon are grouped 
together or are stated in contrast to one another;  
~ conditional sentences that reveal the active powers in the sermon;  
~ emphases, because they often in fact express uncertainty, and often lead to 
logical breaks or conflicts in the sermon;  
~ negations, because they make those issues that the sermons are confronting 
important, because they adjust positions, etc. (cf. Bohren 1989:60).  
In the process, not only does the method interrogate the sermon text about what 
it says, but also about what is not said, what is excluded, pushed aside, transferred 
and even denied by what was said. This enquiry into the inner dynamics of the 
text is systematized with the assistance of four basic homiletical questions, i.e.: 
~ Which God is at issue here? What are this God’s characteristics and how does 
He behave? 
~ How is the biblical text included in the sermon? And, in keeping with the 
particular interest of this study: How does it express the Gospel of 
justification through grace? 
~ What kind of congregation does the sermon appeal to and imply? What is the 
relation to the world/other groups? 
~ How does the preacher him-/herself function in the sermon? 
The study of the interaction between the superficial and the depth structures, 
between explicit and implicit language, offers the potential to interpret the 
sermon theologically. In this way text-immanent analysis and theological 
interpretation form the instruments through which the sermon, as a linguistic 
and theological unit, is heard. The homiletical-theological framework within 
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which this takes place in this study is mainly that of Rudolf Bohren (cf. 1971:3ff), 
which, inter alia, rests strongly on Reformed insights into the nature of preaching. 
The methodology questions the quality of texts, and does not claim omniscience 
regarding the true working of sermons. After all, methods, rhetoric or letters on 
paper do not limit the Spirit. The Spirit works. Herein lie the boundaries, but also 
the promises, of such research. It accepts preachers at their word in an attempt to 
understand them, perhaps to understand them better than they understood 
themselves. In this case, it wishes to understand the preachers’ sermons 
theologically. Therefore, it questions the inner logic of the sermons, as apparent 
from each concrete text preached, and carries this to its uttermost logical 
conclusion; it enters the sermon through the doorway of the superficial structure 
and seeks out the depth structure and decisive associations in order to 
understand and evaluate the true driving forces and motives of the sermons. 
Here too, we do not pretend that the methodology has at its disposal untainted 
objectivity. Like humans, texts are a secret, a living phenomenon with many 
facets. We do not know everything about texts and we do not know everything 
about humans. The exposer of the depth structures of a text can neither claim a 
final word on the “purpose” of the author, nor the “meaning” of the text. At most, 
an analysis is an explication of how he/she interprets the relations between the 
constituents of the text (cf. Deist 1978:264) – an interpretation that needs the 
control and enrichment of other analysts (cf. also Chapter 5). Therefore, the 
methodology distinguishes between analysis and interpretation, but does not 
separate them. Every analysis is already an interpretation, therefore contextual. 
Also the analyst often wants to do what is good, but does not do so (cf. Rm 7). 
Therefore, the analysis and interpretation are meant as the enquiry of a brother or 
sister into the works of brothers and sisters, as an attempt to hear, and to hear 
whether others also hear the same, as a discourse on the preaching, thus on the 
Word of God Himself. 
The analyses that follow must be read in this light. Some interpretations may 
sound drastic. They have not been conducted lightly, nor do they derive from a 
lack of respect for the church or its preachers - on the contrary. I expect much 
from the church, specifically the DRC. Perhaps this explains my grief about a 
great part of the analyses. The reader is entitled to differ from me in this. As long 
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as the issue at stake, namely the preaching of Scripture in our South African 
society, is taken seriously, as it were, through new and sensitized eyes.  
The first round examines the way in which particular historical traditions 
function and their influence on the use of the biblical text and the image of God. 
Here we examine the first hermeneutical step that is taken in these sermons, 
namely backwards into, and eventually out of, history. 
Secondly, the proclamation of the law and the Gospel, and consequently their 
effect on Christology and ecclesiology, are scrutinized. We take a closer look at the 
second hermeneutical step in the sermons: inwards, into the potential of the 
“people’s” soul. 
Thirdly, the study reflects on the homiletical and hermeneutical role of guilt and 
anxiety. In this round the third hermeneutical step is scrutinized: outwards, with 
the projection of guilt. 
The final chapter reaches a few conclusions and proposes solutions. 
In order to allow the preachers themselves to speak as far as possible, there are 
extensive excerpts from their sermons. The sermons are analysed respectively as 
texts, but also as a collective text, as a co-text, that conveys one message. The point 
of departure is that each sermon’s text is an intertext,10 i.e. that it is embedded 
and woven into the wider context of society and here, in particular, South African 
society during the years 1960 to 1980. Thus, as texts, they could not be 
approached atomistically, but as part of a more extensive genre of proclamation. 
Shorter citations are sometimes used to elucidate other longer quotations and 
analyses. This takes place against the background of the incisive analysis that has 
been made of all the sermons. 
                                                 
10 The concept of intertextuality derives from linguistics, in particular the philosophy of deconstruc-
tion, which has its roots in Derrida’s work (cf. Kearny 1986:113-133). There are many shared levels 
between deconstruction and the methodology of sermon analysis that have been applied here, for 
example, the demythologizing of transhistorical projections, the relativization of interpretation 
processes, the creative play with the text, etc. (cf. Degenaar 1986:106). In my opinion, it is of the 
utmost importance that the church uses retrospection to analyse and reveal the destructive myth(s) 
that was rife in this period, in order to gain wisdom and foresight for the future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE FIRST HERMENEUTICAL STEP: 
BACKWARDS INTO, AND  
OUT OF, HISTORY 
The most general and indeed decisive structure for understanding the analysed 
sermons is the situational analogy that is presumed between current and biblical 
times. Its basic point of departure is: what applied then, also applies to us; what 
God did or asked of humans then, also applies in our times. Applied to a person, 
it reads: as it happened to this or that biblical figure, it also happens to 
contemporary people in their encounter with God (Josuttis 1966:23). 
Therefore, the hinges on which such an analogous scheme revolve are often 
expressions such as: “Thus, precisely thus, it also is today”; “We are also …”; 
“Exactly so our people also …”; “Like the Jewish people, our people also …”; “Our 
times and circumstances are not very different than in Noah’s time,” etc. The 
purpose is to say: what we now experience is not unique - others have already 
experienced it. This aims to indicate that the respective times, in reality, are 
identical, and, in so doing, to try to place one’s own situation and time within the 
salvific-historical perspective. The use of this analogous scheme is symptomatic of 
a search for security in a time of emergency. The basic presumption of this is that 
the actuality of God’s Word depends on the parallelism of historically comparable 
situations and the conformity of general anthropological structures. Therefore, 
preaching must seek similarities, identifications, comparisons and examples to 
serve as a current consolation and appeal. 
Greidanus did extensive research on the distinction between exemplary and 
salvific-historical preaching. According to him, exemplary preaching breaks up 
the one history of salvation into many histories, many stories. This fragmentation 
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of Scripture and salvific history compels the preacher to seek the link between the 
past and present in an (unhistorical) analogy. Thus, biblical figures are presented 
as examples from the past to fulfil a positive or negative function in the preacher’s 
striving towards actualization. Biographical preaching of this nature, however, is 
anthropocentric and results in biblical texts with a specific focus becoming 
optional or at least interchangeable. In addition, there is also the reality that these 
examples are not exactly apt for our situations: in fact, the historical gap 
contradicts every attempt to apply them directly; the historical ballast clinging to 
them prevents a smooth equalization. Then, the exemplary recourse is to build a 
bridge between the past and present by way of an atomistic interpretation: not the 
entire person, but merely a few “atoms” of his/her existence and behaviour are 
applied selectively. Normally, the methods of atomization are psychologizing, 
spiritualizing, moralizing and typologizing. However, according to Greidanus, the 
selection of these atoms is arbitrary and subjective. It also represents a further 
dehistorization of the biblical text, as all these analogies are inclined to raise a 
single atom from the flow of history and to place it in a sphere of timeless 
structural equalization. Although the exponents of the exemplary method 
certainly are not so naïve to believe that the historical past and the present are 
literal duplicates of one another, this is, in fact, what happens in this method. The 
past is made equivalent to the present. The point of departure of the exemplary 
method is that the people in the biblical text are regarded as mere mirrors of us 
today (i.e. that they do not have an individual, historical right and existence), and 
that we recognize ourselves in them. However, the power of history cracks this 
exemplary mirror. Exemplary preaching is a homiletical shortcut past the 
historicity of the biblical text, resulting in a hermeneutical, and mostly moralistic, 
short-circuit (Greidanus 1970:85-86). 
Thus, when such an analogia situs is applied in preaching, this must be done with 
the utmost care. Scripture itself often appeals to remembrance, which presumes a 
particular link between the present and the past, as, for example, the closing of a 
new covenant (Jer 31:31-34). However, then it is indeed a new covenant, with 
unique characteristics and stipulations, a new piece of unfolding history (cf. 
Bohren 1974:159ff on the homiletical implications). Therefore, the contingent 
nature of historical situations must not be over-emphasized so that all 
possibilities for communication between the past and present are excluded. The 
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link can be sought in terms of analogies, but then this must be done by way of an 
integrated process of interpretation. In other words, the biblical text must still be 
dealt with as a unit, not as a collection of loose elements. In such an approach, all 
the principles that apply for the exegesis of a biblical text as a historical text must 
be present (cf. Greidanus 1970:214-234). Historical situations are complex. 
Therefore, analogies are problematic, not because they are incidental. Thus, here, 
by “contingency,” I do not mean that the biblical situations are so incidental, so 
accidental, that we can learn nothing more from history, or about God, as, for 
example, historicism advocates. On the contrary, history in fact proves that God 
is unchangeably changeable! However, the problem resides in the fact that the 
sermons decomplicate historical situations by way of unilateral analogies, that 
they transfer a few aspects with specific viewpoints to the present situation of the 
“nation.” 
Therefore, the opposite must also be stated: scripture is a historical document 
that speaks about God’s actions in the past in non-interchangeable, specific 
circumstances, which form the concrete presumption for the concrete 
proclamation of God’s great deeds. As such, it is history and non-recurring. 
Those who wish this to recur must, in the present, reconstruct not only the 
proclamation, but also the situation in which the proclamation took place, as the 
one is not put on record without the other in Scripture. However, this is no easy 
matter and can lead to analogies being presented as cosmetic and forced (Josuttis 
1966:24). Historical situations can only be compared in extraordinary cases, and 
existential structures mostly adopt the concrete contours of specific, non-
recurrent situations. History – also the history of salvation – is unique; human 
situations, their political relations, religious problems and social worlds are 
difficult to reproduce exactly. This tension between the letter of Scripture as 
proclamation of the Name of God in certain circumstances, and the Spirit as the 
presence of the Named, may not be solved unilaterally by a biblicist over-
evaluation of Scripture. Scripture rather offers a type of working hypothesis: for 
us, it spells out God’s Name and invites us to also spell it, read it and proclaim it 
in the hope of the re-amalgamation of the Name and the Named. In this respect, 
Scripture is not a monolithic block of God-speech that can be forced 
fundamentally on certain situations (Deist 1991:378). It rather is the school of the 
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Holy Spirit (Calvin), with a double function: it serves as a criterion for the 
distinction of the spirits and as medium of salvation; and it illustrates how God 
acted and becomes the medium through which God acts again (Bohren 1974:110-
113). Therefore, there is a distinction between Scripture and God’s word. The 
latter is the prerogative of God’s Spirit, without which the Bible and the sermon 
remain dead letters. A unilateral solution of this tension mostly turns back on 
itself with profound theological consequences. 
Now, let us turn our attention to the first analysed sermon. 
The abovementioned use of analogy becomes clear in a sermon based on 
Nehemiah 4:14. The preacher wants to parallelize the threat from the Samaritans 
to the Jews with the threat to what he first calls the “church”, then 
“Christendom”, the “Christian religion” and what he ultimately describes as “the 
South African situation” and the “pattern of life in our land.” He does this with 
reference to the words of the text: “Don’t be afraid of them. Remember the Lord, 
who is great and awesome, and fight for your brothers, your sons and your 
daughters, your wives and your homes.” 
The first paragraphs of the sermon determine the subsequent exposition of the 
biblical text. It goes like this:  
“Times in the life of a church come when it must blow the trumpet 
without fear – or has to follow the more difficult path to its own 
downfall. In such times, the church must ask itself anew, in the light 
of the Word of God, where it is heading. And if it chooses the way 
of being faithful to its calling and to Scripture, then it must prepare 
itself for most aggressive resistance.  
 
“In this struggle there will be journalists who will dip their pens in 
poison; trusting members who will be misled; as well as 
misunderstandings and quarrels, casting of suspicion and 
malignance.  
 
“And, if the church is driven out to the desert of isolation as a result 
of its taking a stand and stating its views, then it must remember 
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that isolation, as such, is no sin. Two thousand years ago the Lord 
Jesus and his small group of followers were the most isolated 
community of that time – and of all times.” 
The first sentence contains an alternative that eliminates all other possibilities 
syntactically; strengthened with the compelling “must” that is repeated three 
times, with rising tension, in the first paragraph. The preacher wants to point out 
the threatening “downfall” and, by the phrase “where it is heading,” suggests that 
the church has already taken the first step along the easier road to “downfall”. 
Now, the trumpet is silent. The conditional construction of “most aggressive 
resistance” illustrates the terrible situation: “And if … then it must” in which the 
“church” must fulfil the condition (cf. Chapter 3 on the function of conditional 
sentences). This is precisely the situation that the preacher has in mind, for which 
he wants to prepare the congregation in the sermon, and which forms the one 
pole in his analogy. 
The second and third paragraphs follow with a description of the “struggle” in 
which the “faithful members” will be “misled” and the church will be “driven out 
to the desert of isolation.” Here, the “isolation” is the result of external forces, as 
well as the fulfilment of (biblical) conditions by “the church.” This is sanctioned 
when the preacher bases the inevitable isolation that comes over the “church” on 
Christology. The isolation of the “Lord Jesus and his small group of followers” 
becomes the legitimization for the isolation of South Africa with its “pattern of 
life” as described further in the sermon. The implication is: isolation must come, 
but is justified; God is for us in our challenge, and against all who isolate us and 
are against us. 
This justification for the current situation of South Africa is strengthened when 
the preacher brings the other pole in the analogy into focus. In this respect he 
makes two significant remarks: 
“And then, in a surprising way, a pattern of action follows that links 
Nehemiah’s time and our own time. The past suddenly becomes the 
present, when the Samaritan strategy is described verse by verse. 
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“And now … have I occupied myself merely with a small section of 
antique history? Or are these patterns illustrated on the walls of our 
time? Are they written in the news columns of the papers of 
yesterday and the day before? Do we read them in the ecclesiastical 
manifestos and theological documents of today? Is history repeating 
itself, repeating itself with alarming consequences? 
The preacher intends to say: the attack against South Africa is nothing new; it has 
a negative parallel in the history of Israel. With the help of rhetorical questions, 
the congregation is informed of the possibility/reality of history repeating itself. 
This places the preacher himself before a dilemma. If the current situation is 
precisely like that in ancient times, does this imply that God will act precisely as 
He did then? Will not only history, but also God repeat Himself? Are his actions 
determined today by this situational analogy? If this is the implication, then the 
preacher runs the risk of falling into an automatist scheme and God image. This 
is a logical consequence of the analogy. 
The purpose of this analogical schematism is good. It expresses the preacher’s 
search for the meaning of the Gospel and, in this way, he wishes to evaluate and 
elevate the current time as a time of salvation. Yet it has exactly the opposite 
effect; in fact, it destroys time as salvific time, by it affecting the dialectic relation 
between God and time in its core. For a better focus on the consequences of this 
process of destruction, i.e. the loss of God in the analogy and the change of the 
sermon as expression of the Word of the speaking God (dei loquentis personae, 
Calvin) into a populist speech, it is important to make a few comments on the 
relation between God and the time. 
In this relation, on the one hand, God enters time; on the other, He remains the 
Eternal - his Being is one of constancy and variation. Let me explain this in some 
detail. 
On the one hand, God works so contextually, He is so varied in his Epiphanies, 
that one must, for example, emphasize with the biblical writers that it is the same 
Jesus who appeared in the fullness of time: Jesus Christ is yesterday and today the 
same until eternity (Heb 13:8). The strangeness, the incomparableness of the 
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Name of God (God is identical with his Name: Nomen Dei est Deus ipse), indeed, 
is in keeping with this chequered way of appearing, with the fact that He indeed 
makes history, always new and surprising (Bohren 1974:100). 
Both the Old as well as the New Testaments express God’s history-making action 
predominantly with the help of linear time categories.11 The linear passing of 
time (history) thus is not conceived as an abstract continuity of time, but rather as 
the God-given content of certain moments in history. God’s objectives for the 
world move to a consummation; things do not just go ahead or return to the 
point where they began. Although the fall of humanity made history meaningless 
and monotonous, it is indeed God’s intervention that (always) imparts purpose 
and new meaning. Linear time is not a sequence of inevitable events, but 
moments, “days,” in which God brings his objective for the world closer to its 
conclusion. These are unrepeatable moments, kairos moments, in which God 
allows a specific objective to be fulfilled at a specific time. The fullness of time, 
with Christ’s coming, the ephapax of his crucifixion, is the most striking example 
of this (Kümmel 1974:141-146). 
Therefore, one must also emphasize that God is the Lord of time and history,12 
that He is the eternal King (1 Tim 1:17). He determines, divides and encompasses 
time, ante et post Christum natum. Before Him there is but one time, and one day 
is like a thousand years and a thousand years like one day (2 Pet 3:8). He sees 
through time, as the Alpha and the Omega, the One who is, who was and who is 
to come, the Almighty (Rev 1:8). In the Holy Spirit, He closes the book on certain 
periods of time, and in doing so creates new time: therefore from now onwards we 
no longer judge anybody according to human criteria; now we no longer judge 
Him thus (2 Cor 5:16). 
                                                 
11 In some instances, for example in the Wisdom tradition, we do find the concept of cyclical time. In 
my view, this does not oppose the notion of linear time. Within linear time there are certain 
occurrences that repeat themselves, for example the seasons, but these repetitions are never 
understood as the inevitable, unpredictable fruits of fate. Cyclical events can be seen as part of the 
linear movement towards the Day of the Lord, even if this Day sees many fulfilments. 
12 Here there is a distinction between time and history, but not a separation. Viewed formally, time is 
God’s gift to humans as a possibility for existence (Barth); history is the actual course of time. 
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Both these aspects of God’s actions with us must thus be maintained, i.e. his 
transcendence and his immanence. Indeed, God reveals Himself in history, and 
this is no deceptive revelation, but his Being that He reveals to us; it is He Himself 
who makes history in his revelation. Between God’s Being and his revelation, 
there is no tension. Yet God is also more than his revelation. God’s reality is not 
dissolved in his work. Because He is more than his works, He can work; because 
He is greater than his revelation and precedes it, He can reveal Himself (Durand 
1976:47). Neither has God, in his revelation, been given to us as manipulable in 
our hands. His Name remains a nameless Name (Miskotte 1965:99-111). 
As the proclamation of this nameless Name, preaching stands in precisely this 
tension. On the one hand, it needs Scripture that is a historically fixed chronicle, a 
concrete documentation of God’s actions in history. On the other hand, 
preaching lives as a promise that belongs from case to case to the moment, to the 
kairos of God’s new activity. Therefore, preaching is never a mere repetition of 
biblical texts, but it always interprets the (present) time as a time of grace and 
judgement: “In the time of my favour I heard you, and in the day of salvation I 
helped you” (2 Cor 6:2); “Now is the time for judgment on this world: now the 
prince of this world will be driven out” (Jh 12:31; cf. also 1 Pt 4:17). 
Such an interpretation of time demands a dangerous undertaking, the dangerous 
undertaking of preaching. It demands prayer. It demands prophecy. It articulates 
the fact that the hour of salvation has struck, and thus drives time ahead (cf. 1 Pt 
3:12a). As such, preaching is possible, yet not possible; it is art, yet not art; as an 
articulation of the Name, it depends on the assumption that God Himself must 
legitimize the preaching, lest the wonder of preaching be negated (Bohren 
1974:93). Preaching aims at re-uniting the Name of God (God Himself) and the 
One named in Scripture – primarily then, a Name address and, as such, a biblical 
address. Strictly speaking, we do not proclaim texts, but the Name of God. We 
proclaim Him who is eternal, the same yesterday, today and until eternity. 
Therefore, Manfred Josuttis significantly comments that the historical distance 
between the Bible and its chronicled activities of God, on the one hand, and 
preaching, as proclamation of His great deeds, hic et nunc, on the other hand, can 
be bridged only with the help of doctrine – specifically the doctrine of God as the 
most internal nerve of theology. This is so because the secret of preaching, 
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indeed, lies in the Name of God (Josuttis 1966:27), but then not so that it is a mere 
addendum (cf. Chapter 3), but rather that it fulfils a fundamental, hermeneutical 
function. In fact, if the Name of God is muzzled in any way, there hermeneutics 
become dumb, or at least serve other interests than those of the biblical text. 
The analogical schematism dispels unilaterally the tension that characterizes the 
dialectic relation between God and time. Instead of the eternal God, Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit being proclaimed as the One who acts in the relative times, He 
becomes bound and thus idolized in the relative times. By implication, He is 
divided into two. On the one hand, He is written into an ancient situation (e.g. 
300 BC). On the other hand, he becomes trapped in the present day. Strictly 
speaking, He cannot act freshly and differently. Ironically, by his being so trapped 
in history and in proclamation, He is taken from history and his Sovereignty over 
history is taken from Him. If I interpret this correctly, through this, He becomes 
an unhistorical principle. Apparently, in the case of the analyzed sermons, 
Reformed preachers here took a few deep swallows from a source beside the 
Bible, namely Plato’s ontology (cf. Deist 1991:369)! 
Actually, this kind of analogical schematism is a way of escaping from time, from 
the continuation of time, and from God’s self-revelation in time; it is a grasping 
back into history to avoid contemporary realities and the future. It represents a 
particular form of anti-prophecy that does not dare to jump ahead, but rather 
arrests time and reproduces history. In this arrest and reproduction, God 
becomes comparable and inactive. However, God is precisely the opposite: He is 
the incomparable active One (Wolf 1969:400ff), because He is distinct from all 
gods, powers of nature, historical events, or the world’s primeval functions. He is 
not similar to the world’s objects and powers; also not identical to people, their 
groups or human behaviour. He is the free ground of all that exists and takes 
place. In no way is He subject to repetition, but is the living One who frequently is 
defined as such – and only by Himself. In this resides His total difference: that 
between us and Him there is an infinite qualitative distinction that can be bridged 
only in Christ and through the Spirit “straight from above” (Barth 1971:171). His 
reality negates the gods of the world’s reality. God is incomparably different, 
especially in that He cannot be moulded in an image. 
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In my opinion, in the analogical schematism a set image develops, of history, 
humans and of God. Unique situations and events, and eventually God himself, 
become de-complicated and fixed in time. This occurs by means of the image that 
is formed of the past and adapted to the present, and vice versa. Because the 
images of the past and the present must fit, must be identical, both become false, 
i.e. a loss of the reality of both the past and the present takes place (cf. Pressel 
1967:352). In their place, this constructed and set image emerges, an unchanging 
and therefore false image. 
By this I do not imply that we can preach without images, i.e. without inter-
pretations of history. In our view of reality, we are not tabula rasa. In fact, we re-
ceive history; hear history merely as told and retold history. The biblical text itself 
is an image and an interpretation of the reality of salvation. After all, it is a 
remembrance of this reality, proclamation of it in a specific situation, a prophetic 
aspect of the salvific reality, and a particular viewpoint of the greater, biblical 
horizon. Therefore, strictly speaking, preaching is already a meta-image of this 
comprehensive reality of salvation. 
For example, Jungel writes extensively on the meaning of “metaphoric truth,” or 
the “theological relevance of the metaphor.” According to him, religious 
communication – also that of the Christian faith – attributes more to reality than 
what actually applies to the situation. However, this need be no “lie” should the 
correct metaphorical critique always be applied, namely the “story” of Jesus’ life, 
death and resurrection as events which redeem sinners. In these events lie the 
ground and the boundaries for the implementation of theological metaphors 
(Jungel 1974:116). Within this norm, metaphorical speech verbalizes aspects of 
the reality that do not (yet) exist and, as such, it speaks of “the truth.” So, 
metaphors call into remembrance in such a way that they open new perspectives 
for the future. They create something new through history being retold for a 
specific audience and with specific purposes. For the audience, it becomes a 
concentration of time (“Ballungen von Zeit”); it presents what was so 
contemporary that something new could be said. This form of memory leads to 
discoveries and enables one to “see everything with new eyes” (1974:116). 
Thus, in preaching, it is of cardinal importance that one frequently asks: what 
“story” (history) is being told to whom and why? A study of the analogical 
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schematism, as it functions in these sermons, illustrates that a single aspect of the 
told salvific reality has become fixated and abstracted, normally with a reduction 
of the biblical horizon, with the objective of justifying the present situation. The 
biblical image must cover the contemporary image. In the process the (told) 
reality becomes a comparison with one point, instead of an analogy that honours 
the complexity of the ancient situation and that of today. The causal point of 
comparison becomes the punctus solus – that transcends reality, or at least the 
proclaimed reality. A point, an aspect becomes abstracted, is lifted from its 
contingent coherence and is turned into a stringent principle. Thus, it is 
overlooked that the ancient “homiletical situation” and that of today are 
contextual situations that were and are determined by many contemporary 
factors, such as the macrocosm (Lange 1976:38: “Grosswetterlage”), the social 
order and life; the political events and ideas of the day, and especially their 
influence on people: anxiety, hope, resignation, feelings of powerlessness against 
the great social processes, etc. These broader factors change continually and 
escape any form of fixation. 
That the analogical schematism fixates certain aspects is evident from the way in 
which God and humans are viewed and described (cf. Chapter 3). This fixation 
can, however, also be revealed linguistically in the light of the way in which 
Scripture functions in preaching. Normally, a stereotypical adaptation of the 
biblical text and selective citation from it takes place. The fixation and abstraction 
of a particular aspect of history has its counterpart in the reduction of the biblical 
text. 
As an example, let us look at a Day of the Covenant sermon based on Ezekiel 
37:1-14. 
An analogy is drawn between the skeletons of Israel that God awakened to be 
living organisms and the Afrikaner people who gradually attained their identity. 
In the process the preacher forces direct links between Israel and the Afrikaner: 
the prophet Ezekiel expresses the situation of the “people.” “In doubt,” he answers 
the Lord’s question – reflecting the uncertainty of the Afrikaner. The word of the 
Lord (full of promises) to the prophet Ezekiel becomes a “warning word also for 
us: Child of man, these dry skeletons are the house of the Afrikaner people.” The 
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pedagogic purpose is to provide the listener with an insightful view into the “real 
situation” in which the Afrikaner nation lives, etc.  
The way in which the preacher omits certain texts and combines others is 
significant. For example, verses 4 to 6 are initially left out, and then verse 6 is 
added, but in a shortened form. The phrase “that you again become alive” is 
replaced with an ellipse as, here, in the introduction to the sermon, it probably 
hampers the analogy between Israel’s skeletons and that of the Afrikaner nation. 
Verses 8 and 9 are also omitted, probably because the preacher wants to reach 
verse 11 quickly. The latter is used all through the sermon as a type of maxim for 
the Afrikaners’ situation. The preacher’s text combination now fits this situation. 
In fact, the preacher designs a text combination and a shift of emphasis to fit the 
Afrikaner situation perfectly, in order to provide scriptural sanction for this 
situation. 
Two revealing understandings of time permeate the sermon. Firstly, the preacher 
states that these events took place during the Babylonian exile under 
Nebuchadnezzar, during which the Jews lived in most dire circumstances. Then 
the second time indication and the analogy follow: 
“Where, in the Spirit, together with the prophet, we now had a view 
of the valley of skeletons, we now wish to try to determine to what 
extent this metaphor also applies to our small nation …. The 
warning word also comes to us where we also are bowed down 
under foreign oppression, the threat on our borders, and confusion 
in our own people who do not know who or what to believe, and 
religious degeneration. 
The fact that the preacher equates the prophet’s situation with that of the 
Afrikaner people leads to further adaptations in the “application” of the biblical 
text. Two examples illustrate this tendency that appears throughout the whole 
sermon.  
First, a subtle one: “Where we now in the Spirit, together with the prophet, had a 
view on the valley of skeletons …” means, for example: we have seen what Ezekiel 
had seen. The passive experience of the prophet in this (“he leads me out”), 
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however, becomes an active continuation of the vision: (“we now wish to try”), 
etc.  
A second, anything but subtle, parallel strengthens the direct connection between 
Israel’s bones and those of the Afrikaner nation: 
“Just like Jacob in ancient times went to meet his brother, Esau, but 
not before he first wrestled with his God …. Exactly so, Blood River 
is the place where the Voortrekkers personally met their God 
through the Covenant. It was at Blood River, by taking the Oath of 
the Covenant, where the Afrikaner nation attained its intimate 
exclusive Afrikaner-centric final acceptance of being God’s blessed 
people. 
The purpose of this parallelization is clear, namely to strengthen and stabilize the 
“Afrikaner people’s” identity. This is especially clear where the preacher extends 
verse 14 with a phrase from verse 10 (“a vast army”) to create the shift to the 
following paragraph, where we hear: “This is the army of 470 men under the 
leadership of Andries Pretorius….”  
The whole implementation of the text and analogizing serves the construction of 
the identity of the nation, and wants to raise the people up again. Ezekiel 37:14 
becomes a type of salvation prophecy for the “Afrikaner people.” 
This analogy has decisive consequences for the sermon’s God image. The Spirit 
does not emanate from the Father and the Son, but from a historical date for 
Afrikaners, from the brutum factum of Blood River. This is where the Spirit 
entered the body of the nation and aroused them to be God’s people. This 
happened “through the Covenant,” which ultimately takes the place of the Gospel 
of justification. The Covenant declares that the people are justified before God. 
However, the analogical schematism not only lacks a biblical horizon, but also 
makes God manipulable: a particular, fixed image of Him can now be proclaimed. 
This is a form of lovelessness for the congregation and betrayal of the reality 
(Frisch, as cited by Marti 1976:173). However, in a situation of threat such an 
image is useful. It can easily be displayed, easily be memorized to counteract 
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anxiety. It is also typically human in situations of anxiety, not to cling to God, but 
to hold God in your grasp, to revert to manageable, familiar images of God. 
Such images attempt to remove God’s power, appropriate this power for 
themselves, and project themselves onto the situation. Speaking theologically and 
homiletically, this is fatal. Images have the nature of ostensibly merely appearing 
manipulable. Ultimately, images manipulate us.13 We are bound through them 
and it is difficult to escape from them. On the one hand, we shelter behind images 
against reality, and they cover our activities and obligations to history (cf. Chapter 
4). On the other hand, they dominate us. They do not liberate us, but enslave us 
with strict imperatives (cf. Chapter 3). We shelter behind images against history 
and history making, against a change of existing realities, and we are so swallowed 
up that we can no longer change these realities. We imprison God and we 
ourselves are imprisoned; simultaneously we are creators and creations of our 
images; fixators and fixated. We no longer see the reality. In our blindness we 
transform metaphors into ontological untouchables, we promote our temporary 
events to become eternal truths and mould our time into statues. Thus we turn 
God into an object, a thing, and He, the Living, becomes monumentalized for, 
and in, our interests. In fact, our images supersede and replace Him.  
This becomes clear in a sermon based on Psalm 56:4. A few citations: 
Day of the Covenant – 16 December – aims to emphasize one great 
truth for us, namely the power and necessity for true faith in God! 
 
This faith in God was the secret of our forefathers, and without that 
characteristic, grace and power in their lives, they could not 
vindicate and cultivate a Christian nation. 
 
The battle of 16 December and the Covenant at Danskraal, which 
preceded it and through which we, as a nation, are bound, 
emanated from this faith in God of the Voortrekkers …. 
                                                 
13 Linguistically speaking, this is true. On the one hand, language is the medium through which 
relations of power are maintained; on the other hand, language is, indeed, formed and controlled by 
power relations. In other words: language exercises power to create images, but images exercise 
power to create the language! (cf. Kress & Hodge 1979:103ff). 
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Thus, to celebrate the Day of the Covenant does not entail boasting 
about people and their deeds of heroism. We are called to note the 
fact that, when they feared, they trusted in God, and that they were 
victorious in, and through, their trust in God. In this, we shall also 
come into a correct relation with our God and our trust in God will 
become firm and strong. 
 
However, the Word of God also calls us to give an account of our 
actions today…. 
 
The Day of the Covenant appeals to us to confess our sins and to 
acknowledge Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour. We must link our 
predestination to God our Father and restore our trust in God…. 
 
But, 16 December appeals to us also to look forward to the future!” 
It is significant that the Day of the Covenant attains a metaphysical quality. In the 
first sentence the Day of the Covenant becomes hypostatized; it becomes a person 
with a will when the preacher says: “the Day of the Covenant aims to ….” Later, in 
an impersonal construction, we hear: “We are called…,” which actually means: 
“The Day of the Covenant calls us.”14 But, more important, by our noting the 
Voortrekkers’ trust in God, “we shall also come into a correct relation with our 
God….” The Day of the Covenant becomes a mediator between God and 
ourselves; those who do not keep the Day of the Covenant, are not in a correct 
relation with God. In fact, the preacher continues, “…the Covenant appeals to us 
to confess our sins and to acknowledge Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour” – this 
                                                 
14 Kress & Hodge (1979:72ff) illustrate convincingly how passivating, nominalization and similar 
transformations have an ideological function. Transformations, according to them, are processes 
through which elements present in deeper structures are deleted, combined and rearranged in 
superficial structures, so that the latter can only be interpreted by a reconstruction of the deeper 
structures. Nominalization takes place when sentences, or parts of sentences, change the 
descriptions or actions and participators in them into nouns. The effect is to blunt the feeling of 
activity, to eliminate the complicity in actions and to transform processes into objects. Passivating 
– to use verbs in the passive form – involves also the elimination and disguising of the main agents 
and focuses the attention of the audience or reader on certain themes to the detriment of others. 
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the Holy Spirit does normally. So the Day of the Covenant also appeals to us to 
“look forward to the future,” and, squeezed in between the appealing voices of the 
Day of the Covenant, the “Word of God” also appeals to us with a view to the 
present. The working of, significantly, the first words of the sermon: “Day of the 
Covenant” colours the whole sermon. 
The use of the words “trust in God” is interesting. As the second key phrase, it 
dominates the sermon. At first, it is called a “secret,” but then a “characteristic” 
and “power,” and in between “grace” - as though the preacher wants to qualify 
what he is saying. In fact, he says that the Day of the Covenant is not about 
“boasting about people and their deeds of heroism,” but, on the contrary, that the 
battle of 16 December “emanated” from trust in God. In addition, our trust in 
God becomes “firm and strong” through celebrating the Day of the Covenant. In 
other words, we already have this potentially, but it must be “restored”, and this 
takes place if we “link” our predestination to God. Apparently, there is a tradition 
of trust in God that links the generations to each other as a national biological 
fact, which is a characteristic of the nation. Viewed rhetorically, the reference to 
predestination is a classical example of “blurring the issue”: it sounds familiar and 
correct, but it means nothing, because who are the “we”; what is the 
predestination and how do we link with it? This is a rhetorical cloak to conceal 
the actual agent in the sermon and to sanction its performance, namely that of 
the nation. Such generalities fit any text. However, the question we should ask is 
whether such texts also fit these generalities and whether their specifics could be 
articulated within these generalities. Generalities are in opposition to the Gospel, 
which always has a specific word for specific people (Bohren 1974:408). 
In any case, in the sermon the inherent trust in God becomes a condition for 
God’s faithfulness: to the extent to which the nation exercises trust in God, He 
demonstrates his faithfulness. The national history becomes salvific history 
through the nation’s trust in God. Here, the doctrine of justification is not so 
much that of the godless who are justified through faith, but the birth and 
identity of a nation that is made possible through trust in God. The good work of 
trusting in God is rewarded with national stability. As in all of these sermons, the 
background is the anxiety-ridden situation of the “nation.” This already is evident 
in the first sentence (“necessity”) and, in fact, the preacher explicitly spells this out 
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in the rest of the sermon, and uses it as an impressive rhetorical technique to 
persuade the nation to adhere to what the tradition (of the Day of the Covenant) 
dictates. In this way, trust in God must be maintained in the midst of all 
anxiousness. 
The formation of images ousts God and creates a vacuum. Then, the image itself 
enters this vacuum as a surrogate for the living God, and, in this way, attains the 
image of a specific kind of myth (for extensive discussion of this process, cf. Slök 
1960:1263ff). This phenomenon is complex by nature and, for example, can be 
described in philosophical, philosophic-semiotic, sociological and religio-
scientific viewpoints. In formal terms the myth is a narrative. Yet it is to be 
distinguished from fables, fairy tales and legends that play roles in their own 
worlds and conclude according to their own rules (until “all live happily ever 
after”) and especially function with their own concept of time (“Once, long, long 
ago …”). Indeed, myths do have their “own” times that transcend the boundaries 
of history, for example, in the so-called anthropogenic myths, in which the world’s 
“ancient history” is told, or the cosmogonist myths, in which the “prehistory” of 
the world is at issue, and certain personal myths, in which either unhistorical or 
historical figures act and who start to display unhistorical, timeless traits in the 
narrative. Yet, the myth often enters into a relationship with “real” time. For 
example, in a cult the myth is retold and celebrated in order to continue it. In the 
cultic repetition the myth attains “eternal” value and, in this sense, it is an allegory 
(image) that verbalizes the “eternal” in human words. Thus, the myth moves from 
the “eternal” into time to again become “eternal.” Myths use time (cult) to keep 
themselves alive. 
In any society myths play an important role. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to 
live without myths (images of reality). They can make life more bearable. In the 
sociological sense myth making is a legitimating system for human relations, a 
system that not necessarily is negative. These systems form a medium for 
collective experience, which determines how people view, organize and 
understand life. They remove the tension and risk of individual choices. On the 
one hand, they offer possibilities for identification but, on the other hand, they 
diminish the playing-fields of freedom and become closed systems (Cancik 
1970:19). Hopewell (1987:46-51) points out that congregations also function in 
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terms of collective narratives, that they express the congregations’ self-perception 
and inner communication and enable participation in society’s greater narrative 
structures. In latching onto the classic categories of Northrop Frey, Hopewell 
(1987:58-62) distinguishes between romantic, tragic, ironic and comical narrative 
genres to express the intrinsic patterns of action, the vision, the story of specific 
congregations and theological traditions. In fact, each congregation or theology, 
whether aware or unaware of this, functions according to such a story! Thus, it is 
a communal story that, explicitly or implicitly, reflects and forms important 
aspects of a congregation’s philosophy and ethos (or, even broader, of a society), 
and elicits powerful emotional responses.  
On the one hand, they function descriptively, in the sense that they describe the 
collective living world, the “symbolic universum” of a group and, on the other 
hand, prescriptively by appealing for concrete deeds and attitudes in order to 
maintain the myth (Adonis/Smit 1991:4). In this process there are a number of 
“fixed points,” such as revelatory traditions, heroes, etc., that cause the myths to 
offer a type of “objective security” (Cancik 1970:18), a safe and familiar world 
within which the members of the group can flourish. 
However, a myth also has the potential to be destructive and self-destructive. It 
can endow certain matters (truths, half truths, untruths) with ontological 
authority, sanctify them and make them unassailable; they can make society not 
more bearable, but inhuman and even destroy it. A myth can perpetuate social 
injustice as archetypical eternal orders (Croatto 1983:41). From history this 
appears especially to be the case with religious myths, where the myth gradually 
starts adopting the role and function of the Word of God, of the Gospel itself, but 
then so that it functions unilaterally and with authoritarianism, and with feigned 
godly sanction (1983:43). Thus, while it is simplistic to contrast myth and truth 
from the start, it also is a fact that ideologies are interwoven with myths 
(1983:30). They demand fine scrutiny and ideological criticism, in which the 
choice is not between myth and non-myth, but between various types of myths, 
either edifying or destructive. In this respect, Grabner-Haider (1989:290) appeals 
for the humanizing of myths and religion by guarding against the inadequate and 
destructive elements of myths, i.e. their ideological traits. 
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In this research I follow the classic findings of Roland Barthes (1964:110ff) 
regarding the philosophy of language in connection with myths. He researched, 
linguistically, the creation and the development of common myths and came to 
the conclusion that this type of myth interprets and relates history in a way that is 
fundamentally different from historical science in writing history. While the ideal 
of the latter is the understanding of history in all its facets, myths change history 
into nature (1964:113). A few viewpoints are abstracted from the unique 
interrelation of historical events and changed into a repeatable pattern. This 
pattern or principle is applied with a specific objective, for example, the 
justification of social, political or ideological structures. In fact, myth is richly 
chequered and can serve any common, human needs and actions. 
According to Barthes, the essence of a myth exists in its love of, and continuous 
search for, timelessness. Real history is negated, annulled and changed into a 
myth.15 To be timeless, the myth thus uses history and never becomes altogether 
detached from it. It also does not want to do so, because it lives on it, finds its 
roots in it, and especially conceals itself in it. According to Barthes (1964:97ff), 
this secretive game of hide and seek defines the nature of myth. 
The analogical scheme, which also wants to create a timeless system, is a form of 
myth building. One of the components of myth building, indeed, is to make a law, 
a principle, from two specific non-interchangeable times, and thus escapes from 
history. In this case, the biblical, as well as Christ’s, history also disappears (cf. 
Chapter 3) and is so betrayed that it is at variance with reality. Because real 
history is replaced by the myth, biblical history is no longer a unique event and 
one day of the Lord, nor is the contemporary situation, which preachers want to 
justify, a unique event, a new day of the Lord. No day of the Lord comes to 
fruition, because the myth defines it away and eliminates it by means of analogical 
schematism. The myth lives on this timeless “nor…nor”, it is a tertium non datur, 
a third power alien to reality. It is not a real history, but an intellectual history, 
because it has an intellectual birth, contrived and moulded by humans. 
                                                 
15 Contrary to this, one could argue that historical categories of causality are only extensions of the 
antique myth (cf. Naude 1963:33ff). In my opinion, what could indeed be said is that historical 
concepts of causality reduce complex data to rational categories and, in this sense, change them 
into a new premise. 
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This “history,” this myth, is the nation’s history as reflected in the sermons and in 
which the people’s identity can be found. The purpose is that the national history 
must attain eternal, unchangeable value. This takes place through an “exchange” 
and identification of histories:16 the salvific history is replaced by the nation’s 
history, and vice versa. The history of the people becomes divine, becomes a 
revelation – of the myth. In the process God is not only dehistoricized, but He 
also becomes historicized nationally in the sense that he must legitimize the 
national history. This exchange of histories is possible – in Barthes’s term 
(1964:113ff) – because the myth changes history into nature, because it brings to 
the fore and absolutizes timeless, generally valid, stringent aspects of history by 
means of abstracting, reduction and analogies. 
In the analysed sermons this distinctive “salvific” history of the people is told and 
retold, virtually without exception. It forms the unassailable fixed point of 
departure and assumption. On the one hand, this is done to remind the “nation” 
of its past. On the other hand, it must serve as an impetus with the view to the 
future. However, its most important function is to serve as apology, as justificatio 
populi in a time of threat and anxiety. It forms the frame of reference and anchor 
for stabilizing the current national identity. From this national historical 
foundation, it also wants to say: God is for us. 
A telling example is a sermon on Psalm 62:6. It starts with a national-historical 
view on Psalm 62:6, which forms a type of framework within which the sermon 
explains the text and has a strong suggestive power: the text now also has 
important things to say to the Afrikaner people. It proclaims certain national 
historical events (1961; birth of a Republic) as divine revelation, a “direct result” 
of the prayers and surrender of the forefathers in 1902. In eschatological terms, 
the sermon refers to “the liberated”, who “one day, from every race, and language 
and people and nation will sing the new song in the kingdom of the glory,” but 
this reference is not only out of place with the rest of the sermon, but also is the 
                                                 
16 Since the 1930s and 1940s this tendency was quite explicit in some sermons. Many elements of the 
way of preaching that we research here naturally can be found in preceding decades. A single 
example – as deterrent! – “If we listen to the songs of praise that rise above the domes of churches 
and the roofs of halls, then it is as though we hear the voices of two that call: the voice of God and 
the voice of South Africa” (Boshoff 1959:10). 
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often used rhetorical technique of blurring the issue, of softening the real 
argument. The preacher in fact wants to intensify the focus on one “nation”, not 
many. Therefore, he emphasizes that this nation must look “past” the noise of 
(other) nations; that the Roman Catholic Portuguese and Spaniards sailed “past” 
the Cape of Storms, while the pious forefathers landed here, and that the nation 
must “look away” from the humiliation and threat presented by the economy, 
allies, weapons and warmongers. On the one hand, the national history then 
becomes the source of appeal to bring order to the national house. On the other 
hand, the faithful waiting and the stance of the pious people forms the condition 
that God will again act in the present and will “ensure” the people’s future exis-
tence. God becomes the great Guarantor of the nation’s future existence, but on a 
condition: God, who created the people out of grace, will only allow them to exist 
in future if they act according to certain ideals. God’s actions depend on the inner 
condition of the national soul: “If a nation’s heart is right, then its future is safe.” 
Like a refrain, the conditional sentences sound: “If … then … is …” (cf. Chapter 3 
on the function of conditional sentences). 
The closing paragraphs of the sermon elaborate these ideas further and read as 
follows: 
“In these hours of crisis in their existence, the nation of South 
Africa must expect much from God. We must not have our view 
obstructed by powerful enemies, but must focus on the Almighty. 
We must have great expectations of God and must be alive in faith. 
 
“And, on the road of South Africa, there are beacons of light as 
symbols of glorious victory, because our people expected everything 
of God. 
 
“In an alien, wild country, at the beginning of the people’s 
settlement, Jan van Riebeeck brought a dark Africa before God in 
prayer, and Africa opened up for the Gospel and civilization. 
 
“Farmers moved into a cruel and wild country where predators and 
barbarians were a dangerous threat, but, in lonely farmhouses, the 
Word of the Lord saved a nation from being frightened away.  
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“In very dark moments – Vegkop, Marico, Blood River – a small 
nation just trusted in God, and, for God, a small minority was a 
majority. 
 
“In their struggle for freedom, a courageous nation lost, but, in their 
defeat, they became silent before God and placed their expectation 
only on Him. A free, united nation grew from the remaining stump. 
“And now again, the people of South Africa must expect much from 
God. Our Father never gives his children a stone when they ask for 
bread. ‘Seek the kingdom of God and his justice and all these things 
will also be given to you.’ 
 
“In prayer and witnessing about the Lord, expect a renewal of his 
church. 
 
“Pray that the Word of God will be proclaimed with power and that 
our people will act righteously, will consider love and walk humbly 
with God. 
 
“Then the Lord will be our shield and fortress in the struggle. 
“Then a beautiful future will be our destiny and our people will also 
be able to provide leadership in the world. 
 
“We must expect also this from the Lord – that when the hour 
comes for our nation to provide leadership – and it will come; that 
we will then provide leadership according to the guidance of the 
great Leader who leads all things to a triumphant end. 
 
“The God of heaven will make us happy, and we, his servants, will 
prepare and build. 
 
“Just be quiet before God, my soul, because my expectation is on 
Him – Amen.” 
The first paragraph begins with an exclusive claim, namely that there is no other 
“nation of South Africa” except the Afrikaner nation, followed by the imperative 
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flowing from the national history (on this, cf. also Chapter 3) emphasized by the 
use of “must” no fewer than five times. For this, the “beacons of light” on “the 
road of South Africa” offer encouragement. Even more important: the nation’s 
historical performance becomes the most profound basis and reason for the 
glorious victories in South Africa: because this “small nation just trusted in God.” 
The nation’s history itself becomes the source of the revelation (“beacons of 
light”), becomes revelatory history; it operates as the norma normata according to 
which South African history, and eventually also the future, is to be judged. The 
point of departure is this: previously, the whole nation was for God, therefore God 
was for the whole nation. The people’s actions ensured their triumph. This is 
spelled out with the assistance of four reminders of the forefathers’ performance, 
and described in such legendary and idyllic terms that the fathers become 
dehumanized, people without shadows, a great crowd of national witnesses, as it 
were, who must inspire the present generation. Jan van Riebeeck breaks open a 
“dark Africa” with his prayer “for the Gospel and civilization.” The “Word of the 
Lord” saves the trekking farmers exclusively “in lonely farm houses … from being 
frightened away,” and they stand in strong contrast to the “hard and wild land” 
and the threat of the combination(!) of “predator and barbarian.” Despite the 
country being wild, the nation is saved from being frightened away. Dark 
moments of the national history (“Vegkop, Marico, Blood River”) are lined up and 
the national idyll repeated: not only did the nation expect “everything” of God, 
but also “trusted only in God.” Their dedication was complete; therefore they 
again placed their expectation “only” on God after their defeat in the freedom 
struggle. This expectation caused their so impressive growth that the preacher 
can validate it with a prophetic word: “A free, united nation grew from the 
remaining stump” (cf. Isa 11:1). 
On the basis of this national legend, the “people of South Africa” must again 
expect much of God. As an ethnic body, the people must, “In prayer and 
witnessing about the Lord, expect a renewal of his church”; the people’s prayer 
and witness must allow the church to relive. This is possible because the people 
are “children” of “our Father.” The people’s prayer is the condition for the Lord to 
ensure the future, that He will be the “shield and fortress in the struggle” – 
against other nations (with emphasis on: “Then … then …”). This is also the 
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condition for the nation to “provide leadership in the world.” Here the idyll 
reaches its apex; it becomes a fantasy of omnipotence: the nation definitely will be 
the world leader (“and it will come”). For this, he needs a triumphant example, 
whom the preacher does not name (“the great Leader”), but he implies it is Christ. 
Christ becomes the example for the nation on the basis of the piety of the nation, 
and with the view to the consolidation of this piety. 
If I have understood it correctly, this sermon does not so much interpret the Bible 
text (Ps 62:6) and respectively proclaim the Gospel to the congregation, but 
proclaims the national history as legend and ideal to the people. This forms the 
actual text, and actual gospel of the sermon. 
It is clear that this myth of the national history has a decisive influence on the 
structure of the sermons and, indeed, in this respect it exercises great power to 
perpetuate relations of domination (see Chapter 1). After all, this is not 
something that started yesterday or the day before, but grew in the South African 
theological tradition and way of preaching. Yet the paradox of this is that it 
remains within the realms of unreality. As national pastoral rhetoric, it lives on 
(elements of) reality, to act against reality, and to escape from reality. It usurps 
and equates itself with biblical history, especially the history of Israel and, using 
that as an incessant guide, implements this to keep itself intact. The relation 
between Israel’s history and the mythological history is that of example and 
image: Israel is taken from its unique revelatory context, starts functioning 
homiletically by itself, and thus becomes the storehouse for imagery. In the 
process, it becomes homiletically counterproductive, hampering the open view on 
the biblical as well as the contemporary South African reality; and it does not 
allow a prophetical insight, perspective and outlook. The courage to face this 
reality and the freedom to confront it, therefore is obstructed. 
The mechanism – we could say the theological tool – with which the myth opens 
the entrance to invade and destroy reality is analogical schematism. In fact, in the 
sermons it is characteristic of this myth that, in essence, it is concomitant with an 
analogical schematism. The one does not exist without the other. The myth 
reproduces itself via the analogical schematism. To be able to do this, before any 
change dare take place and as a deterrent against transformation, it must always 
reproduce the status quo, or rather the status quo ante. Different to other critical 
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myths, for example, in Marxism, this myth is a national myth that is vigilant over 
the nation’s self-preservation and self-justification. Therefore, it is against change 
in principle. It functions like a pre-judgement against all signs of it; it is intolerant 
of all other historical images. For itself, it demands an explanatory monopoly of 
history and turns preachers into opinion monopolists. After all, it tells the 
national history before the actual history has taken place; it already knows 
everything in advance. 
In its most profound core, this myth has a conservative structure. After all, it 
allows time, as mythical time, to freeze. The point of departure is that yesterday’s 
world (or in this case, yesterday’s unreal world) has the monopoly on what is 
right, and that this right –God Himself - is preserved therein. From the start, any 
opposition, or even dialogue about it, is excluded. The myth offers a code for 
preservation. Its stereotypical components form the code’s secret writing that 
must invoke immediate and predictable reactions in those programmed. It wants 
to keep the control, keep producing the manual, the instructions for use, as the 
myth requires, when the world goes to rack and ruin. It forms a refined weapon in 
a bitter struggle to exist, in a situation which rather requires prophecy. 
Simultaneously, it is an action driven by necessity, born of anxiety, but also has 
the strategy of a law holder and enforcer, an anathema and exhortation to 
disempower the opposition and to keep the threatened order intact. It always 
views itself as the only security, as the exclusive condition for life to be realised 
amidst change. It always offers itself as a secure stronghold, despite crumbling 
foundations. 
The tragedy of this myth is that it is self-destructive, in contrast to other myths 
that are self-propagating. From the sermons it appears that this powerful myth has 
been shaken in its foundations, that it has begun to lose its historical power, despite 
the fact that all was being done to spread its spirit (illusion!) in South Africa. The 
reality starts to punish the unreality; the cranial, intellectual history starts 
bumping and breaking this cranium against the reality. Why? Because the myth 
not only arms against all that is “outside,” but also corrodes internally, because it 
is doomed to self-destruction by its ultimate self-isolation and loss of realism; 
because people participate more in this reality, are more part of this reality than 
what the myth wants to and may allow…. 
GOD FOR US? 
 40
The connection between the myth and the apocalyptic mentality dominant in the 
sermons is significant. Myths function differently in times of peace and quiet than 
in times of national crisis (cf. Hanson 1983:13ff). The growing panic at social, 
political and economic level, and the naked fear of imminent total extinction, 
sometimes causes myths which were dormant and obscured under the surface for 
many years suddenly to become aggressive, to fiercely form a lager against what is 
regarded as a threat to the foundation of life. Essentially, this myth is a survival 
strategy according to old recipes, a strategy which, historically speaking, had a 
certain effect and offered a certain security. Now, this is applied to the present 
and must also ensure the future. Towards this purpose the myth rallies all its 
power - regardless of the cost and no matter how few the supporters.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SECOND HERMENEUTICAL STEP: 
INWARDS, INTO THE POTENTIAL OF 
THE “PEOPLE’S” SOUL 
In the process of building a myth, analogical schematism uses a number of 
mechanisms that are usually reliable signs and consistently accompany 
schematism, and belong to the essence of the myth. For example, the analogical 
schematism is continuously articulated in imperative speech structures. Between 
analogical schematism, myth and these speech structures there is a logical and 
assessable connection. In fact, the analogical schematism as such already 
embodies and therefore provides the imperative structure. The actions or 
situations of people, who, in biblical times, formed the presumption for the 
proclamation, today become conditional for the content of the proclamation to be 
activated again (Josuttis 1966:24). What previously was a word about God’s 
actions in history becomes a word about people’s actions in history, and in such a 
way that it forms an appeal to the present audience to act accordingly. 
Theological declarations become moralistic appeals; given situations (in which 
God acts) become conditional situations (in which people must act), for example: 
“For us the transition from the old to the new year must also mean 
what Ahawa meant for Esra and his co-travellers.” 
 
“Like Nehemia, every father and mother, every young person and 
child, every national leader and educator, every preceptor and 
preacher must feel God’s hand on him.” 
The analogical schematism first projects a false image on the reality, and then it 
appeals for the maintenance of this image. The image forms the norma normans 
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for action and the image demands action in accordance with the descriptive and 
prescriptive nature of the myth (Chapter 2). Therefore, it is quite understandable 
that the analogical schematism mainly appears in conjunctive speech forms: 
realities are discussed as possibilities; instead of realities, possibilities are 
postulated in the grammatical form of the conjunctivus irrealis. However, these 
postulations are also subject to a condition: when people perform certain actions, 
it will be evident that the mythological postulated and unreal image of history can 
become a “reality,” that it is “true” and “normative”; the current time will then 
indeed be akin to past times, and vice versa. Therefore, the conjunctivus irrealis 
becomes visible in the conditional construction of sentences, even when it does not 
function in this way explicitly, as in “when … then,” “if … then,” etc. In this way 
salvific historical realities, the reality of God Himself, are discussed. Because God 
is incorporated into the postulated image of history, He is also discussed in unreal, 
conditional terms (Bohren 1991:3). 
As an illustration, I refer back to the sermon based on Nehemiah 4:14 (see 
Chapter 2). The analogical schematism brought the preacher to the point where 
he asks whether history will repeat itself. Should this be the case, as indicated, 
God is taken out of history by implication, and He is made unreal. The conclusion 
of the sermon can, indeed, be understood in this way. I quote a few core 
paragraphs: 
“But then 2500 years ago, a word of God fell into the heart of a man 
and when this man communicated this word to his people, then the 
scene changes because people have changed.” 
 
“But, do we think enough of ‘the great and formidable God’? Is his 
omnipotence still an experienced reality for us? 
 
“Does the message, the work and the results of the church still stand 
in the sign of the powerful wind of the Holy Spirit, the wind that 
blows where it will and which cannot be stopped by any human 
power or science? 
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“Like Peter, do we look at the waves resulting in the depths 
swallowing us, or do we look at the Finisher of our faith, who 
demolishes mountains and dries up oceans?”  
 
“O, if God only again could attain a first place in our thoughts, our 
judgements and our actions, then the church will be able to do 
something awesome to, and for, this world. 
 
“Yes, then the rest of Nehemiah’s commands will also be executed. 
Then we shall be able to ‘fight for our brothers, our sons and our 
daughters, our wives and our houses.’” 
 
“When Nehemia spoke about a struggle concerning the lives of sons 
and daughters, wives and houses, there was no despondency in his 
heart, because, in the same breath, he could say: think about ‘the 
great and formidable God.’” 
 
“But when I receive the grace and the enlightenment of the Holy 
Spirit to think above all of the great and formidable Lord, then I 
hear the King of the church also saying to me: ‘For God nothing is 
impossible.’ ‘Not through power or violence, but through my Spirit, 
says the Lord of hosts.’ 
 
“Then the church can answer with a joyful heart: ‘Who are you, 
great mountain? Before Serubabel (before the Church of Jesus 
Christ) you will become demolished!” 
With these paragraphs, the preacher wants to build a bridge from the biblical 
history to the congregation’s present situation. Therefore, the first sentence starts 
with the present tense: a word “falls” and there is a man who “communicates” it. 
This is followed - still in the first sentence - by the past tense: the scene changes 
“because the people have changed.” The preacher has exactly this in view: that the 
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audience - people who live in critical times - will change, like the people changed 
in the olden days. The past and the present, after all, must overlap. But how? 
The following paragraphs consist of a series of rhetorical questions17 concerning 
the position of the congregation and the church, yet they do not say how the 
change can take place. The questions imply: the things that are questioned are 
not so; the answer to all is: No. Therefore, people must change and make it true – 
change the No into a Yes. This is brought to a head in the following key sentence, 
in which not only the circumstances, but also God’s position in the 
circumstances, is conditional on human action: “O, if only God again could attain 
such a first place, then ….” Here God is not articulated as a reality, but a 
possibility, a possibility that is conditional: God only gets a first place, if we have 
changed. The same conditional, unreal construction applies in respect of the 
“grace and enlightenment of the Holy Spirit.” 
When people have changed, then they will not sink down into “depths” (here 
Peter serves as a negative example), but they rather rise and do “something 
awesome” to, and for, the world. Nehemiah is presented as a good example; he 
moved from depths to peaks because he did not have “despondency” in his heart. 
Therefore, people who must change, must take note of this person who changed, 
they must look into his heart, into his soul, and so learn not to lose hope. This 
psychologizing of Nehemiah then serves the imperative. The closing conditional 
sentences of the sermon (“When … then … and then ….”) sends the congregation 
away with the assignment: please change, so that this “when” can be now, so that 
God can get the first place in your lives and you can experience the grace and 
enlightenment of the Holy Spirit. 
The sermon’s strong imperative character brings to the fore the problem of the 
relation between the law and the Gospel. This relation is complex and cannot be 
dealt with here in all its facets. Luther calls the correct distinction between law 
and Gospel the highest art and wisdom of the Christian faith (summa ars et 
sapienta christianorum)! This distinction applies especially to the nature of true 
                                                 
17 Although one should obviously not generalize, questions of this nature are, according to Josuttis 
(1996:20), often a sign of legalistic speech.  
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preaching. To distinguish between the Gospel and the law means becoming a 
preacher. One can only preach this relation (Iwand 1964:13). 
Manfred Josuttis (1966:118ff) studied legalism incisively in post-war German 
preaching and concluded that there were so few evangelical18 sermons, exactly 
because there was not a clear distinction between the law and the Gospel. 
According to him, those who want to preach evangelically learn to distinguish the 
Gospel clearly from the law, because the evangelical aspect of the Gospel exists in 
its distinction from the law. However, those who understand the Gospel also 
learn to preach the law afresh, because the evangelical aspect of the Gospel 
liberates God’s law from legalism, from people’s misuse of the good law. The 
distinction between the law and the Gospel thus also provides the distinction 
between the law and legalism; the first brings the second to the light. Legalism is 
an irresponsible combination or mixture of the law and the Gospel upon which 
the ideologization of the Gospel and moralization of the law then follow 
(1966:13). 
This combination can adopt a variety of forms. For example, the weight can lie on 
the side of the law – then the positive functions of the law (the so-called triplex 
usus legis) are separated from the indicative of the Gospel; the law attains a 
legalistic tint. Or, the weight is placed on the side of the Gospel, its pro nobis 
nature must make room for the demands that people must fulfil; the Gospel is 
misconceived legalistically. The essence of all forms of legalism is the separation 
between God and humans, between his Word and our words, between heaven and 
earth (Bohren 1991:3). The absent God must be “presented” as present. In these 
sermons this entails that rhetoric becomes an independent force, contrary to 
theology; that the preacher must do with words what only God can do. However, 
because this is not based on salvific realities, but on unfulfilled conditions, it 
imparts the character of the subjunctivus irrealis to the modus of this preaching, 
not the praesentia realis dei.19 
                                                 
18 This has become a loaded term, often used by different authors to denote different viewpoints. It is 
used here in the context of the relation between law and gospel, that is, as a definition of preaching 
that articulates the gospel in the Protestant sense of the word. 
19 Bohren’s whole homiletics could in a sense be understood from the perspective of the presence of 
God. He writes extensively about this in his Predigtlehre 1974, Chapters 17 to 20. 
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Also, the distance between the tenses (past, present, future; cf. Chapter 2) must 
be bridged in this way. Humans remain in the present time under a locked heaven 
with only themselves to look to. Because this is what legalistic preaching does: it 
turns people inwards, bending them into themselves. In this respect, the preacher 
probably is the most bent and the loneliest of all. He20 must encourage the 
congregation, but he himself is despondent. Because the Gospel must make place 
for human action, because there is no exoneration proclaimed and therefore acted 
out in the speech structures of the sermon, the preacher’s encouragement is false 
and his reasoning is empty. God once walked on earth; now only his footprints 
and the demands for following in his footprints are discussed. The point of 
departure, most profoundly, of legalistic preaching is God’s absence. In this sense, 
speaking theologically, nothing happens in these sermons: the congregation is 
informed about what happened in biblical times, which however does not happen 
today and what the congregation now must do to allow it to happen again 
(Josuttis 1966:30). A legalistic sermon is without reality, without God’s reality and 
God’s working. Because this reality and work are not expressed, an escape route is 
taken by the proclamation of a legalistic law, a legalistic Gospel, and all possible 
shades in between. So, the Name of God (his presence) becomes a sucked-out 
egg, a shell without content. The Name loses its being (Bohren 1991:3). 
This of course does not mean that the Gospel as such does not appeal for action, 
for the response of obedience. On the contrary. However, evangelical ethics is 
never conditional and is never based on unreality. It is based on salvific realities in 
the Gospel, which are not conditional. The Gospel does not demand, but gives. It 
precedes all human actions. Only in this way does the law attain its positive and 
life-giving meaning: that it is not conceived as a demand, as a naked command 
that humans must obey from their own reserves, but as a liberating 
empowerment for daily life from the Word of God. God commands by his giving; 
God also gives by his command (Josuttis 1966:20ff). Because God gives to us what 
He asks of us, He can ask of us whatever He wishes (Augustine). We are put to 
work, but the task is undertaken at God’s initiative. Between God and us a 
theonomous reciprocity develops, an interaction, which is permeated from 
beginning to end through the grace of God (cf. Bohren 1974:76ff). 
                                                 
20 In this case, exclusive language must be used. All of these sermons were preached by men. 
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In my opinion, this integrated interaction is broken principally in these national 
sermons. While there is an abundance of national appeals, the lack of speech 
structures that articulate the free grace of God is significant.21 The nation’s 
threatened situation apparently makes the arch-temptation to exchange the 
Gospel for a legalistic law even more irresistible, and especially to exchange it for 
a legalistic Gospel, as the analyses indicate. The Gospel itself is affected in its 
heart, in its very essence. Its “weakness” apparently does not offer solutions for a 
situation that requires drive and action; therefore, a law is grabbed that makes 
things more manipulable and viable. In this way anxiety must be countered. After 
all, it appears to be more “logical,” and offers more “handles” in difficult times. 
We must try and understand this. This type of sermon is based mostly on the Old 
Testament, where faith is accepted as obvious because all are “of Israel,” and a 
particular covenantal metaphor of conditionality functions strongly – especially 
in the Deuteronomistic texts and Jerusalem’s theology. Those who do not 
interpret the Old Testament theologically fall prey easily to equating a nation 
(here, the Afrikaner) with Israel and thus forming a type of civil national religion 
(cf. Deist 1990:124-137). 
In fact, the majority of sermons start with a perverted type of ethics (in the sense 
of a political threat to the national ethos) instead of theologically. The whole 
structure of the sermon is determined thereby and normally illustrates the 
dramatic wrestling of the preacher to offer theological (but in effect: legalistic) 
answers to the questions that are raised by the national ethical point of departure 
and, paradoxically, it indeed illustrates the preacher’s battle to escape from 
legalism. 
                                                 
21 Research done on tendencies in Afrikaans religious programmes (Müller 1987:44-46) indicates an 
interesting parallel: the religion that is offered for general Afrikaans-speaking people is almost 
always imperative in nature, but then not as an appeal that affects the daily and concrete reality. It 
rather is a type of alien-to-life, non-existential appeal – a type of mythological demand! The 
programmes’ contents say virtually nothing about the objective extra nos of salvation and faith – 
upon which the Reformists placed so much emphasis. 
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In the sermons stereotyped national ethical situation analyses,22 which often 
form the introduction to the sermons (cf. also Chapter 4), offer the background 
against which appeals to the nation are made and, in this sense, function as a 
motivation for legalistic declarations, such as the following: 
“Become more inspired every day and show more enthusiasm every 
moment for eternal and unseen things …. Allow a divine power to 
flow from you into society and the world in which you live.” 
The preacher means well, but is heartless. An absolute demand confronts the 
congregation (“become more inspired every day and … more enthusiasm every 
moment … divine power”). Nowhere in the sermon is this imbedded in the 
theological context and promises of the gospel. Rather, the congregation is left 
alone with the impossible: “Become more inspired … Allow … flow from you.” 
This might qualify as a motivational speech, but, in my opinion, not as the 
Gospel! 
“The question that comes to us, as individuals and as a nation, is: 
Do we still possess the trust in God that was so characteristic of the 
Voortrekkers and that was the secret of their way of life that 
reflected strength of character, their unconquerable spirit? Do we 
still know the God of our fathers? Do we still know the infallible 
promises of his Word?” 
In this case the listener (typically, not the congregation, but “individuals and … 
nation”) is left alone with a law that emanates from the ideal image of “strength of 
character” and “unconquerable” national heroes. However, there are few things 
that are as intolerable as the dumb command of a good example (Mark Twain). In 
the light of the “good example,” the audience is confronted with a question and 
turned into themselves. National heroes become the law. I repeat: this is not the 
Gospel! 
                                                 
22 Naturally, situation analyses can be used positively in sermons and form the background against 
which the Gospel is unlocked. However, experience has taught that this often is not the case (cf. in 
this connection Josuttis 1966:33ff). 
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“In our history there were people with names such as Sarel Cilliers, 
Andries Pretorius, Piet Retief, Paul Kruger … names that stood like 
rocks. Names of men, who kneeled before God’s open Word, took 
their standpoint and took their vows: We shall stand steadfast; we 
shall trust; and we shall not allow ourselves to be swallowed up; and 
to God all the honour!”  
 
“Where are their children and those of others like them today? 
What is the value of a name …?” 
 
“Today, the responsibility rests on us not to lose what our ancestors 
attained with their blood through our weakness of spirit.” 
Again the congregation is confronted with the claims of a national nomos, this 
time so that national figures attain the same function and status as idealized 
biblical figures, e.g. Daniel and his three friends. A double imperative, as it were, 
goes out to the congregation: the exemplary demand of Daniel and his three 
friends, via Sarel Cilliers and other national heroes, is directed to the 
congregation. They may not be weak in their spirits; but must rather stand “like a 
rock.” The purpose certainly is, as the political slogan says, to take from history 
what is good (perfect) and to build the future with it. But I contend again: this is 
not the Gospel! 
All these forms of legalism presume a person with potential, a person who can 
even undo sin. As the point of departure, legalism takes not only an unreal, absent 
God, but also a vital, intact person, a homo intactus instead of a homo peccator. In 
this case, the “national theology” leads to a distorted anthropology and a distorted 
ecclesiology. It finds its breeding ground in a faulty hamartology (understanding 
of sin) and a theology of triumph – of the human being (cf. also Chapter 4). In 
essence, these sermons could be called “liberal”: superficially, they seem 
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“conservative” and “correct”; however, their more profound basis is not the Gospel, 
but human beings. Even if this human being is also pious.23 
A significant example is a sermon on Noah’s times and the difficult times that the 
“nation” experiences. The sermon starts in a stereotypical way - like many 
sermons from this era: 
“It is not news that our national life is being attacked.” 
Already in this first sentence decisive hermeneutical decisions are made, affecting 
the rest of the sermon. On the one hand, this implies that the national life is 
inherently good and guilt is not the cause of the threat. On the other hand, those 
that lead the “onslaught” are the guilty and, indeed, they are forces of evil. Further 
in the sermon we hear that the nation is “the prey, the target of the onslaught” 
[my italics] (cf. in this connection Chapter 4). This is followed by a detailed 
description of this “onslaught” against “our traditions and morals” and an 
analogy: 
“One gets the impression that our times and circumstances are not 
very different from those in Noah’s time.” 
This means: those who lead the “onslaught” are like the evil and corrupt people in 
Noah’s time, while the nation is identified with Noah, but then a very specific type 
of Noah. This, for example, is apparent from the following: 
“Against this dark background of a time of sin and unrighteousness, 
Noah is outstanding. He shows that God, at all times, is prepared to 
give his blessing to a person who is prepared to walk with Him. 
Noah shows that a person can remain upright amidst 
unrighteousness and faithlessness. And, for us, the miracle and 
encouragement is that God never changes: that He is the same 
                                                 
23 In an investigation into the scriptural exegesis done in the Dutch Reformed Church, Deist (1993; cf. 
especially Chapter 4) indicates that “unsanctified” reasoning has to a great extent become the basis 
of this type of theology, a state of affairs that is homiletically confirmed. 
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yesterday (in Noah’s time) and today (in our time) and to eternity 
(until the end of time).” 
The strong emphasis on human potential is again significant. Noah is “out-
standing” and proves “that a person can remain upright.” In contrast, sin forms a 
“background” of which Noah is not part. But even more: his remarkable piety 
becomes the condition for God giving his blessing, because God is “at all times … 
prepared to give his blessing to a person who is prepared to walk with Him.” 
God’s preparedness is subject to Noah’s preparedness. This is also stressed by 
saying that God always acts thus! 
The example of Noah is taken further when the preacher builds a bridge to the 
present: 
“If Noah could do this, then anybody else can do this by the grace of 
God in Christ Jesus. But we have become weak - people without 
mettle or deed.” 
The preacher possibly notices the overemphasis of general human potential in the 
abovementioned sentences (the presumed human capacities) and tries to 
relativize this by his reference to grace. Rhetorically speaking, this reference is 
again a technique of blurring the real argument (cf. also Chapter 2). Who the 
“anybody else” is here is not mentioned, and especially not how the grace must 
function – that is, how the “by” must be understood. However, the context clearly 
indicates that, for the preacher, grace is the result of human action. The 
technique of blurring, indeed, functions in this way: it seems like A, but actually is 
B concealed in a rhetorical cloak. Superficially, it seems like the proclamation of 
grace, but the deeper basis is human, in this case the nation. The reference to 
grace, in fact, is robbed of its power by a string of semi-palagian sentences, in 
which humans, with their potential, are at issue again. Admittedly “weak” 
humans, without “mettle or deed” (cf. “have become …”), but still humans with 
the necessary potential to live up to the national ideal. 
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This sentiment is clearly heard in the conclusion of the sermon, where the 
preacher gives the “answer” to the “onslaught on our national life,” i.e. where the 
first sentence of the sermon finds its “solution”: 
“On the other hand, like the prodigal son, you can take a decision 
when reading these words. You can decide that if the grace of God 
was enough for Noah among his contemporaries, then his grace is 
also enough for you among your contemporaries. You can bow 
before God and accept his grace in Christ Jesus. You can arrange 
your home life so that the Word of God holds the central spot. You 
can remain upright against external onslaughts by arranging your 
life so that it will be clear to all that you walk with God – Amen.” 
Again, here the “grace” of “God” and “Christ Jesus” are mentioned, but all this is 
subject to humans who act. Like a refrain it sounds: “You can….” 
While the biblical text has a theological content in the most profound sense of the 
word, and wishes to give insight into God’s heart, the sermon interprets it in 
anthropological categories, and it wants to provide insight into Noah’s pious 
heart. In fact, his figure fulfils a decisive role as example in this sermon. He is the 
image of the homo intactus, who must be emulated in the analogical schematism 
(here an anthropological analogue), according to which the nation must model 
itself in an exemplary fashion. In this sense, he is the false, fixated image of 
history (see Chapter 2), a person without shadow or stain; even more, he is the 
fixated image of God Himself. In Noah, God becomes incarnated as homo 
intactus, so that he takes over the role and place of Christ. Strictly speaking, 
Christ and the use of his Name in the sermon are unnecessary. Noah is already 
there. He is the anthropologized image of God, the basis for my possibility to do 
that for which I have been called. The Name of Christ only forms part of a 
rhetorical blurring technique, behind which the ideology of a justified nation is 
concealed, a nation that becomes the norm through which the rest of the world is 
judged as evil and corrupt. This judgement takes place on the basis of the image 
of Noah as intact national idol and with the presumption that the nation’s 
“traditions and morals” are inherently good. 
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In the light of this anthropologization of Christology, it is understandable that the 
analysed sermons have difficulty with proclamation as nihil nisi Christus 
praedicandus. If I have interpreted this correctly, Christ and the message of 
justification through grace do not fit into the fundamental hermeneutical 
structure of these sermons. A short-circuit takes place in which the 
anthropologization of Christology is concomitant with the Christologization of 
anthropology. The uniqueness of Christ becomes common in humanity: every 
person becomes a Christ.24 
As a result of research done concerning German sermons on God’s Providence, 
Rudolf Landau (1981:191) coined the concept, anthroponomous subordination. 
By this he implied that the dogmatic topos of the concursus Dei or the cooperatio 
Dei et hominum has to be understood thus in general or, in any case, has to be 
expressed in words, that God’s actions are to be subordinated to the general 
moral quality of human actions. Humans subordinate God and compel Him to 
passivity by betraying the Word of justification by grace only in favour of the 
ecclesiastical homo faber. This ancient guilt of the church is an attempt to undo 
what God did in Christ in the church and theology. Human work “improves” and 
replaces Christ’s work. 
Although there certainly were essential differences between the German sermons 
and the sermons taken from Die Kerkbode, the tendency to subordinate God 
occurs in both. Thus, for example, in anthropologizing Christology, both 
preaching traditions display strong individualistic traits. The embarrassment of 
the nation’s condition apparently does not lead to the discovery or rediscovery of 
the church in its existence before God, but to a distorted ecclesiology and a 
sinking back into individualism. Because the nation has declined and can no 
longer be trusted with the myth, individuals must save the situation. 
An example of this individualization is a sermon based on Nehemiah 2:20. The 
introduction reads as follows: 
                                                 
24 This should be distinguished from the New Testament perspective of being transformed to become 
Christ-like (e.g. 2 Cor. 3:18). Luther, for instance, said that we should all be (a) Christ for one 
another. The difference, however, lies in the basis of these confessions: in the sermons it is a 
moralistic basis, distorting the theological context within which Christ-likeness should be 
understood. 
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“Those who, in these disrupted times, regard God’s Kingdom and 
their own soul seriously, those who regard our nation and their own 
house seriously, must undeniably realise that every Christian has a 
costly calling.” 
The double “we” of the biblical text (“We are his servants, and we will start 
rebuilding …”) becomes a double “those who” in the first sentence of the sermon. 
This “those who” conceals the imperative: the listener must become one of “those 
who.” A series of things which must be taken “seriously” is mentioned and the 
result is a concentration on the individual: “every Christian” must realise that he 
or she has a costly calling. This individualization we hear throughout the sermon, 
for example: 
“It behoves everybody, with all the sincerity of his soul to ask 
himself the question: What kind of builder am I on the spiritual 
house for which God destined me?” 
Here, we have an almost classic model of legalistic hermeneutics: the 
individualization of the first sentence of the sermon is continued (“everybody … 
himself”); the listener is isolated and cast back upon him/herself; the question is 
aimed at the potential of humans; the figure of Nehemiah is presented as an 
example and as the law to the individual, etc. Especially conspicuous are the 
adjectives, nouns and adverbs that are used to strengthen the imperative, namely 
“all the sincerity of his soul” and, further in the sermon, “most profound 
sincerity”; also “positive … continue the building”; “faithfully labour and pray”; 
“make … willing,” etc. 
This emphasis reveals that, in the preacher’s opinion, the appeals, as such, are too 
weak: they must be strengthened and radicalized, must adopt puritan dimensions. 
A person – the individual – must act in the superlative, must (in a legalistic way) 
be changed into the image of a Christ. The emphasis represents a type of reversed 
kenosis: not Christ who gives up his equality to God (sicut esse Deus; Phil 2:6) and 
becomes flesh, but people who give up their equality to people and (want to) 
become God, who determine God’s actions through their actions. 
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This can be seen, for example, in the conclusion of the sermon: 
”Those who open their hearts for the Spirit of God and accept the 
cross with courage, will be heroes and heroines to God. Through 
faith, we must say: ‘The God of heaven will allow us to succeed, and 
we, his servants, will prepare and build.’” 
Not for nothing are those who fulfilled the list of imperatives that were stacked in 
the sermon called “heroes and heroines.” This is their reward. But then they must 
first open their hearts for the Spirit and courageously accept the cross, and they 
must be able to recite the specified biblical text – all human actions. Those 
individuals, who qualify to be the “we” of the sermon, rob God of his freedom in 
this way. However, the irony is that God cannot be robbed of his freedom, nor 
can individuals qualify for the high demands (e.g. to “open their hearts for the 
Spirit”). 
Naturally, individuals are important. The Gospel is about persons, not only about 
masses. However, in the above-named individualization, the individual is taken 
from his/her bond with the congregation; it no longer is two or three plus Christ 
(Mt 18:20), but an individual plus his/her potential. 
Thus, the myth does not stand only on its own (timeless) legs. It needs human 
legs, human potential to keep itself alive in time - that of individuals… and a 
nation. In fact, the majority of sermons, deal with more than individuals. They 
deal especially with the nation. While God exonerates, truly exonerates, the myth 
as an unreal image demands unreality, the unattainable: that the nation will save 
itself. The myth compels. It does not tolerate people who live by grace, out of 
God’s reality. Instead, it calls to the fore inhuman people, people without shadows 
and sins. For this the “national history” and “national heroes” offer the example, 
the primeval image. A compelling imperative emanates from them to transmit the 
myth from generation to generation, with the result that evangelical paranesis 
degenerates into mythical patriotism. 
The consequences of this are far-reaching. Per definition, the church is defined 
away. This is logical: people who are not able, who are not strong and do not have 
the mettle, are not in line with this mythical patriotism. People with empty hands 
GOD FOR US? 
 56
must stand aside for people with strong hands. Because the myth closes its eyes to 
Christ, it also does not see such empty-handed and broken people. It is the 
(theo)logical consequence of the myth: those who deny Christ also deny the 
congregation. After all, the congregation is nothing but one of the ways of life of 
the present and real Christ (Bonnhoefer, Christus als Gemeinde existierend; cf. 
Beckmann 1961:327-338). Other than his presence in, and as, the Word and 
Sacrament, Christ after all is also Christ pro nobis in, and as, the congregation 
insofar as the congregation is God’s revelation, and insofar as his Word yearns for 
the image of a created body (Prenter 1965:262). By people living in theonomic 
reciprocity, i.e. through the grace of God as a congregation, each becomes a 
Christ for his or her neighbour (Luther). However, this actually takes place 
differently than in a legalistic anthropologization of Christology or the 
christologization of anthropology, as the basis for this is totally different: not in 
human beings, but in the Gospel. Therefore, the myth blinds itself also to the 
reality of the congregation, a reality born from the Gospel, and it supplies a 
surrogate: the “nation.” The myth replaces God. The nation replaces the church. 
God is robbed on all sides: He has neither angels, nor a church…. 
That the boundaries between “nation” and “church” are flexible, that they are 
even alternative terms, is a fixed and – as far as the myth is concerned – a logical 
element in all the sermons. The church is swallowed up by the nation, and the 
nation is swallowed up by the church. 
Out of an abundance of examples, only one: 
“The powerful streams of alien ideologies surge against our nation 
and our church. Many of our fellowmen in faith are turning their 
backs on their church and nation, and on our own nation’s past. 
Some of the leaders and quiet forefront fighters for alien influences 
in South Africa are people with Afrikaner surnames! Agitators 
against our church often have names of Dutch Protestants and 
Huguenots. Some so-called members of the church, whose names 
are still on the church’s registers, use their power in movements 
that oppose the church and are alien to the nation!” 
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The stereotypical “our nation and our church” (mostly also in this sequence) 
contain a conjunction (“and”), but, in fact, it functions as a unit and indeed as a 
threatened unit. Brothers in faith are equal to compatriots; those alien to the 
nation are simultaneously alien to the Gospel and “hostile to the church.” Those 
who threaten the nation, threaten the church; those who become disloyal to the 
nation, become disloyal to the church. Nation and church shift seamlessly into 
each other. The fundamental rule is: God is pro nobis, if we are pro patria, 
otherwise not. 
The interweaving of nation and church means the end of the fourth article of the 
confession of faith, the transformation of faith in the church into faith in a nation. 
The source of the church is no longer Christ, but the nation. An ecclesiological 
degradation takes place: the church figures virtually nowhere as a creation of 
God’s Word (creatura verbi), but rather as a creation of either the individual, or 
the nation, as a self-generated product (creatura ipsissima). This perverted 
creational act depends on the assumption that the church is non-existent, or at 
least at the zero point. By means of fulfilling legalistic demands, a caricature of 
the church must thus be created, and it must be moved from nothing (ex nihilo) 
to the maximum national potential. 
In this way, the church as una sancta catholica is fundamentally not understood 
nor appreciated. After all, in the myth the church is rooted in the national 
association itself and so separated from the ecumene. It appears that legalistic 
preaching, in general, results in a church being torn apart, and that a church being 
torn apart produces legalistic preaching (Bohren 1992:13). After all, the nation’s 
faith is exclusive and therefore a schismatic faith: only those who are part of the 
national history, therefore of the nation, participate in it. Essentially, the sermons 
are not concerned about the one, catholic church, but about the condition of the 
nation. All the sermons include a type of “national programme” which consists 
basically of moralizing appeals. The nation must be strong and healthy. In this 
way, God will ensure its future. Within this national imperative framework, the 
unique nature of the church, as church of Jesus Christ, can in essence not come to 
fruition. 
By this I do not deny that a close link between church and nation can exist. After 
all, the church is sent to all the nations with the command to make disciples of 
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the people (Mt 28:19). However, this implies that the church must remain free 
from the nation, from all nations, exactly to be able to make disciples from their 
ranks. In that the theological sequence of church and nation is being reversed in 
the sermons, the nation usurps the position of the church and makes it powerless.  
In his classic work on church and nation in German Missiology, Hoekendijk 
indicates that panta ta ethne is a terminus technicus for the whole of humankind 
out of whose midst God gathers his people. Therefore, the idea of national 
christianization has no foundation in the terminology of the mission assignment. 
Especially in the Old Testament, there is a much greater social differentiation 
than a mere schematization in national ordination. There is no mention of a 
“scriptural sociology” of national christianization. Furthermore, Israel is not the 
first historical example of an ideal nation, a primeval type for all other national 
concepts; that would mean secularization of the Old Testament’s concept of 
God’s people. God’s people (church) and nation are not co-existent; there is a 
continuous “contrast of ‘church’ and ‘nation’” (Hoekendijk 1948:235). Ethnic, 
linguistic and national moments of Israel are indeed mentioned and appreciated, 
but never form the basis of the nation. They are only peripheral phenomena of 
the novum: the people of God. God’s people have no analogies, and cannot be 
fitted anywhere into existing formations. Sociologically, this is impossible 
(1948:229-237). 
In this light, I want to expand on what Landau (1981:191) calls the 
anthroponomous subordination of God: when individuals do take the place of the 
Gospel not only as individuals, but as a group with a structured way of life and 
shared experiences, symbols, heroes, traditions and values, then it becomes a 
partitionomous subordination of God (partitiones = group). Then the group’s 
descriptive norms and prescriptive laws rule over those of God, then their own 
values and appeals are sanctioned and mystified as though they are from God. 
God Himself is held captive intra muros mythi (within the myth’s walls). He has 
to serve its establishment, maintenance, propagation and defence. Everything and 
all who oppose this, who do not think, act, speak and live accordingly, are 
regarded as enemies. (More about this in Chapter 4.) 
The anthroponomous and partitionomous subordination of Christ does not 
imply that the Name of Christ does not appear formally in the sermons. In fact, a 
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flood of Christological sentences that must conceal, rhetorically, more profound 
theological deficiencies often characterize legalistic sermons. After his analysis of 
a large number of legalistic sermons, Josuttis concludes that a false objectivity 
often appears in the Christology of these sermons. The Christological formulae 
that are handled are theoretically correct on the whole, but abstract, 
interchangeable in respect of the biblical text. Such Christological core sentences 
are often surrounded by a number of biblical sayings or hymnal verses, because, 
in this way, the preacher wants to disguise his principal inability to express 
biblical, Christological confessions as the Gospel for concrete people in concrete 
situations. A mist of secrecy, of inconceivability, of mythological admiration must 
then cover the Gospel. This process has a legalistic influence on the listener. The 
Gospel is not articulated as an offer of salvation, but rather presented as a holy 
example that must be reproduced. The Christ-event becomes a medium for the 
homo religiosus to complement his or her shortcomings; Christ becomes a 
Preceptor and Example for faith preservation (Josuttis 1966:61-70).  
Where the Name of Christ indeed appears, it is mostly as an addendum, as a 
space-filler, possibly because the preachers subconsciously feel that the legalistic 
structure of their sermons cannot lead anywhere, cannot lead to life. Using the 
Name of Christ must negate the embarrassment with the unreality, must help to 
fill the theological gap in the proclamation. This procedure results in Christ not 
being presented as the Saviour, but as a national helper, and so Christology 
becomes idolized. Christ must help the nation on its way, and is presented as the 
great triumphant Example, as a superb “Mister Jesus” – who has never existed 
(Van Ruler 1969: 68). In reality, Christology thus serves the ideology of national 
justification. 
For example, as follows: 
“How serious the threat is - also for us in South Africa where we 
experience the same danger as Israel! We shall also cease to exist as 
an independent, pure Christian people, if we disregard the 
boundaries that the Creator has instituted. Should we not see much 
clearer the danger that threatens us as well as our descendents?” 
 
GOD FOR US? 
 60
“There is only one Leader who can lead us and our descendents on a 
road that leads to security, safety and true independence – Jesus 
Christ. While holding our children’s hands, let us faithfully seek 
Christ through his Word and through his church. Only then will 
our nation remain a Christian and happy people.” 
In these declarations, Christology is not only subject to the nation’s “Christian-
ity,” but also its independence, safety, security and purity. Jesus is presented as the 
great Precursor, the “Leader” in this. On the one hand, the search for the Leader 
is the only way (“Only then …”), in which the nation will remain Christian and 
happy. On the other hand, and contradictorily, the people will “cease to exist … if 
we disregard the boundaries that the Creator instituted”. Apparently Christ is not 
the only way to national security, but this can also be achieved by the people 
isolating themselves from other nations. Any possibility that Christ can hinder 
the nation on its way to purity and security is excluded. He must rather guarantee 
this. 
In these sermons we have this sad contradiction: mentioning the Name of Christ 
is actually superfluous, but also not superfluous. It could also be interpreted as a 
concealed and subconscious cry for help, out of desperation and self-isolation. In 
this case, not only the law, but also legalism is a type of “disciplinarian,” in a 
distorted way, to Christ (cf. Gal 3:24). This is an observation made by the 
Ecumenical Association in many analyses of legalistic sermons. The Name of 
Christ is taken into the service of humans, and at the same time expresses their 
deepest need of liberation, of the Gospel! However, in these sermons this distress 
call, in my opinion, comes too late. Up to the points when the distress call is 
heard, the sermons depend on a structure that profoundly affects the reality of 
the gospel. Luther called the negation of this reality nothing but an annihilatio 
Dei, an obliteration of God. This need not be expressed in crass atheism, but can 
also adopt refined forms, even in small, insignificant twists of language. Also here 
God can be made to conform to people’s needs, can be recreated into a human 
image, when He (must) think like people, (must) want what they want (cf. Burger 
1983:104-105). 
The second hermeneutical step 
 
 61
The annihilation of God, the displacement and replacement of God by images (cf. 
Chapter 2) can begin unobtrusively, also in Christology. However, those who 
damage a mere jot or title of the cross, obliterate it. The cross is not an 
addendum, but the heartbeat of the Gospel. Those who view the cross as an 
addendum to human potential leave no space for God’s grace. After all, 
preaching, in fact, is a nihil nisi Christus praedicandus, a proclamation of Christ, 
of grace alone. In my opinion, these sermons exclude, methodologically and 
syntactically, the Gospel as a gospel of the cross. Speaking in respect of human 
logic, the foundational structure of these sermons cannot lead to the Gospel. 
After all, they do not need the Gospel. The myth has become its own gospel. And 
annihilated God. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE THIRD HERMENEUTICAL STEP: 
OUTWARDS, WITH THE  
PROJECTION OF GUILT 
The analogical schematism forms an unreal image of history and appeals to 
people as unreal (i.e. innocent) people to maintain this image. One of the ways in 
which these people are raised and kept thus is by projecting their guilt onto 
others. The first step was a step back into, and out of, history, into the 
timelessness of myth. The second was a step inward, into the potential of the 
national soul. Now, the third is a step outward, projecting the guilt from the 
“inner group” (the nation) onto the “external group” (the enemies). Croatto’s 
(1983:32ff) analysis of the Atrahasis epic indicates that the latter, in fact, is a 
centuries-old component of national myths. Such myths are implicitly against any 
form of revolution and, therefore, identify the guilty as targets as soon as the 
nation experiences uncertainty. Its own innocence must continuously be 
perpetuated with this projection of guilt. In the case of these sermons, it is this 
nation, after all, that must make the analogical schematism true, and so allow the 
myth to function. In a certain sense, this projection of guilt is the tip of the 
iceberg. Here, the deeper nature of the myth is apparent at its clearest, 
manifesting itself through the superficial structure of the (sermon) text, and 
confirms the preceding analyses in a concentrated way.  
On the one hand, the homo intactus is thus regarded as a vital, active person. On 
the other hand, when it comes to complicity in what is wrong in history, homo 
intactus is regarded as a passive, sold-out person. Throughout, the enemy is 
regarded as the active force, but then in the negative, guilty sense of the word. 
This active-passive dualism forms a fixed component in each “situation analysis” 
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that is made: the future existence and identity of the nation are at risk, it 
experiences one of its greatest crises - but did not cause it. 
Two short examples: the first deals with Jeremiah 3:23 and illustrates the contrast 
of passive sufferers and active enemies.  
The Afrikaner nation, indeed, finds itself in an unenviable position. 
We are eminently the target of hate-propaganda in virtually all 
countries worldwide. Many associations or complicities are busy 
inciting hatred and intolerance against us, apparently supported by 
virtually inexhaustible financial sources. In writings, newspapers, 
over the radio, by means of television, the crudest lies are 
exuberantly blazoned forth presenting our nation as evildoers. 
“The plan is clear. We must be isolated and then ultimately be 
liquidated….” 
 
“As regards weaponry, we may not receive the most essential for the 
protection of our own country and lives – we must be disarmed to 
eventually, with the least trouble, be dragged like sheep to the 
slaughterhouse.” 
 
“And what our condition will be on that day when the dark wave is 
allowed to break over us in its hellish power, what will happen to us, 
our wives, daughters and little children – one’s heart wavers to even 
make a slight attempt to visualize this. Truly, death, a speedy death, 
may then be a preferable deed of grace!” 
The activity of the “others” is described – their fierce hatred, thorough 
organization, complicities, incitement to intolerance, crude lies, deeds of 
isolation, liquidation, etc. All this is a dark wave that explodes in hellish power 
over “us.” In contrast, “we” are a target, divested of the most essentials, sheep that 
are led innocently to the slaughter. An offering. 
This passivation of verbs, which has a typical ideological function and contributes 
to the blurring of the main agents in a grammatical construction (Kress & Hodge 
1979:72ff; cf. also Chapter 2), reveals its extreme implications with this idea of an 
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offering. In his multi-disciplinary study on myths, Grabner-Haider (1989:127-
128) indicates that, indeed, one of the basic traits of the myth, on the one hand, is 
to view the group as an offering by expressing helplessness and weakness with the 
help of emotion-driven linguistic structures. On the other hand, it is to purify the 
group from feelings of guilt by presenting the opposition as inherently evil 
(heretics, witches, enemies of God, etc.). Throughout this, the motive is self-
preservation, but ironically enough, it serves the spiral of guilt and destruction: 
the more the enemy is damned and destroyed, the greater the guilt and, therefore, 
the need for guilt projection. 
A similar example from a sermon based on the New Testament deals with the 
miracle of the storm that Jesus stilled (Mk 3:35-41). After an introductory 
sentence that poses the “remarkable similarity” between the events on the stormy 
waters during which the disciples “had to call out with fear” and the “crucial times 
in which we find ourselves as a nation,” the preacher continues: 
“As stormy as it was and could become on sea, figuratively speaking, 
the waves of unrest on a continent could threaten the existence of 
life. So, our beloved land with its racial problems had to experience 
this during recent times ….” 
 
“Our nation also experienced this just so during recent times amidst 
terrible threats and this has not yet ended. Racial riots, the advent of 
a threatening anti-Christian nationalism, secret winds of 
communist incitement and internal violence also made us aware of 
problems, so that all started speaking about the problem and want 
to call out: ‘Master, don’t you care?’”  
The situation is analysed, but again so that the audience (“our nation”) adopts a 
passive role. External factors “threaten” them and they are endangered by 
“terrible onslaughts.” It comes to a head with: “…this has not yet ended.” For 
example, there is still the “rise” of dangerous powers, of “secret winds” of 
communism that (like the stormy winds on the sea) blow stronger and stronger. 
The worst is still to come. However, the origin of the “problem” is external to the 
“nation.” 
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All of this “our beloved land … had to experience.” It is a law, an inevitable 
condition – the “nation” is exposed to an external power – in which it “finds” 
itself. Like the disciples “had to” call out, so the “nation” also “had to” experience 
the threatening catastrophe. All this is illustrated within the framework of the 
storm, a natural event that excludes guilt and has originated externally to the 
“nation,” and is falling upon them – a mighty power that threatens to annihilate 
and thus sink them to the bottom. According to the preacher, the origin of the 
“problem”, including the “racial problems,” “racial violence” and the “internal 
violence”, lies here.  
This polarization by means of speech forms and images implies that actually there 
are two addressees in the sermon: the congregation and the oppositional forces 
who are addressed indirectly. The congregation becomes the witness to the open 
protest against these opponents (cf. Richter-Böhne 1989:123). In the process, 
distance is created between the congregation and the indirect audience. By 
speaking with extreme restraint about their own implication in the “problem” and 
with extreme expressivity about the implication of the other, a hostile image is 
outlined to the congregation. There can be no community, no unity between 
those who are near and those who are far. The first function of this projection of 
guilt is self-justification, in the sense that a negative delimitation of the others 
confirms their own identity. To the extent that the others are stigmatized as 
enemies of God, the nation is stabilized as friends of God; the polemic against the 
others strengthens the apology for what is their own.25  
A sermon on Esther 4:14 illustrates poignantly how the polemic in this polariza-
tion is implemented. The point of departure is that there is a similarity between 
the time of Esther and “a time such as this.” The preacher declares: 
                                                 
25 The investigation of current preaching within this perspective would be an interesting study. In my 
opinion, there is reason to believe that this is still the case in some instances and that we work with 
a closed ecclesiology that needs an enemy to function. In this sense, the enemy not only threatens, 
but also confirms. Over the years, the Gospel has become “anti-something”: anti-humanist; anti-
communist; anti-gambling; anti-homosexuality, etc. Consequently, God exists by the grace of Satan 
and so evil becomes an essential element of the preaching. This is much more Zoroastrianism than 
Christianity! 
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“Those who can discern the signs of the times correctly, will agree: 
we, the Afrikaner nation and Christendom in Southern Africa 
experience times of crisis as never before. About this, experts of our 
time agree ….”  
 
“Our greatest danger is not the Communist force of arms or the 
military power of some or other country; our greatest threat is not a 
struggle against flesh and blood, but against the subtle power of the 
dark, that is unobtrusively and slowly but surely breaking down our 
nation and our Christian believers’ spiritual standards, our sense of 
moral and spiritual values. Modern Hamans threaten our future 
existence. All around us we again hear the cry of the French 
Revolution: equality, liberation and brotherhood and a misplaced 
emphasis is placed on unity – often to the detriment of the natural 
differences between races, nations and churches, as willed by God; 
and a false ecumenicity is striven towards, to the detriment of 
pluriformity or variety. All over, we also observe the signs of a so-
called dialogue between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism - 
the truth and the lie. The slogan of the day is: away with differences 
– one church, one world, and one nation! And behind this slogan 
we see the Sovereign of the Dark who is preparing the world’s scene 
for the appearance of the Antichrist. May God open our eyes before 
it is for ever too late. We are in a crisis! 
Not only are there again the stereotypical “threats” from outside and “around us,” 
but “our nation and our Christian believers” have spiritual “standards” and a 
“sense of moral and spiritual values” as an assumed capacity, and “we” are also 
able to “notice” and “observe” that the actual enemy of the “nation” is the “subtle 
power of the dark,” the “Sovereign of the Dark.” All this takes place against an 
apocalyptic background in which the “Antichrist” is coming. Here the polemic 
leads to the enemy being understood in terms of demonic activities. In a 
Manichaean and dualistic way, not only the world, but also God’s relation to the 
world is divided into two: He is for “us,” and He is against the “others” (cf. also 
Chapter 2 on God’s dichotomy). In this sense, the situation analysis also serves 
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the unreal; it grades the nation as superhuman, innocent people and it degrades 
the others as inhuman, demonic people! As a dichotomy of passive and active, of 
God’s friends versus God’s enemies, this depends on the fictitious alternative and 
hypothesis that the others are in the sphere of Evil, and the nation is in the sphere 
of Virtue. “We” are an offering because of “our” Christianity and devotion, and 
the “enemy” threatens because of its unchristian stance and Godlessness, because 
of its subservience to the “lie” and the “darkness.” The intolerance of the myth is 
again evident in the nation’s confronting the “others” (cf. Chapter 2). 
Polemicizing and caricature of this kind opens the way, in turn, to take the 
nation’s apology to its limit. The sermon on the history of Daniel and his three 
friends (also cited in Chapter 3) warns against the possibility that the world’s 
opinion can eliminate the nation by the latter being equated with this opinion. A 
few conclusions read as follows: 
“Now, we also know through history that there were always certain 
nations on earth who were a hindrance, and in the way of other 
nations. So, Israel was a hindrance to Babylon. Therefore, Israel had 
to be eliminated. This is also the case with our nation, who, with its 
particular view of God’s will and way with us and God’s destiny for 
us, today is an offence for many. The way in which we intend to 
exist, and also to exist in future, in our complex situation of race 
relations and problems that no other nation on earth has exactly 
like we have it, is simply not accepted – in fact it meets the anger 
and wrath of nations on the world’s stage. There they feel that the 
world’s spirit of citizenship cannot develop while there are 
‘stubborn’ people in South Africa who want to remain members of 
their own nation as God created them. Therefore, eliminate them, is 
the slogan. Eliminate them by equating them with everybody. Teach 
them to speak the language of everybody else….” 
 
“In our time, God seeks people who can say: ‘My name is Christian; 
my food is God’s will; and my language is my nation’s language.’ 
This small group of faithful people will experience what Daniel and 
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his friends experienced. Not human numbers, but God’s wonderful 
power will be decisive….” 
Here, the apologia populi (“way in which we intend to exist and also to exist in 
future”) is anchored in the predestination by God. When the preacher says: “So, 
Israel was a hindrance to Babylon… This is also the case with our nation, who, 
with its particular view of God’s will and way with us and God’s destiny for us, 
today is an offence for many,” there is a direct and sanctioning line between “So 
… was” and “So … is”. It implies: today the nation is what Israel was then, people 
whom God has sought, a “small group of faithful people” who cling to the truth 
against the rest of the world, against “nations on the universal stage.” In this 
theological framework the others are not only conceived in terms of demonic 
activity, but the nation is also conceived in terms of God’s predestining actions. 
It is clear that this framework rests on a particular view of the doctrine of sin, a 
view in which the thought of concursus (co-operation) functions in a narrow and 
one-sided way. No distinction is made between transcendental and categorical 
causes in history, and people (in this case the nation) are ultimately portrayed as 
mere marionettes in the hands of the “Almighty.” When guilt indeed is at issue, it 
is on account of the others. The nation’s own sins, their involvement with the 
distorted course of history, are not mentioned at all in concreto and, in any case, 
dogmatically speaking, these sins are never conceived of as peccatum actuale. 
However, without this, no matter how “correctly” it is confessed before God, sin 
becomes abstract; as misunderstood peccatum originale, it becomes a docetic 
principle. After all, the one qualifies the other: on the one hand, a concrete deed is 
sinful because of its sinful origin; on the other hand, sin finds its outlet in people’s 
concrete deeds to others. Sin always assumes an interhuman form; offences 
against God always include, as flip-side of the coin, offences against people. Sin is 
a religious, and therefore social, phenomenon (Berkouwer 1960:15ff). 
In the light of the South African reality(!), the sermons serve to keep the nation free 
from guilt; as a matter of fact, they represent a carefully structured call not to 
repent. Actually, this cannot be any different: after all, the nation must carry the 
“promise” of the myth and dare not, as such, have any guilt. To proclaim or 
confess guilt is to play into the enemy’s hands. In this sense, the nation rises even 
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above Israel, above the fact that Israel’s history is mainly one of unfaithfulness. 
Also, in this respect, the example of the forefathers is a decisive driving force. Note 
the pivotal role that the forefathers play in the following: 
“Our ancestors experienced many crises. The Huguenots 
experienced a great crisis when the Edict of Nantes was recalled and 
they had to flee for their lives from their fatherland, France. But, 
they fled with the French Bible to the Southern-most tip of Africa.” 
 
“The Voortrekkers faced a huge crisis at Blood River; but, with the 
Bible in his hand, Sarel Cilliers could make a vow to the Almighty 
on their behalf.” 
 
“How dark it must have been for the representatives of the Boer 
commandos in 1902 at Vereeniging, when they had to sign away 
their country’s independence! But, it was Rev. Kestell who took the 
men to a tent and there read Psalm 62 for them: ‘My soul finds rest 
in God alone; my salvation comes from him.’ 
 
“In their dark hours our ancestors had the Bible as their guide. Our 
Calvinist fathers were oriented to Scripture. In our times of crisis, 
we must cling to the Bible. The Bible is strong and strengthens. Our 
fathers lived from the Scriptures, and the Scriptures declare: God is 
King. He reigns. But, I am his responsible child, through Him I have 
been predestined, and to Him I am responsible. Those who make 
this principle the foundation of their lives and world perspective, 
rise above the worldly and the sinful. Therefore, ask about the 
‘ancient paths … the good way’ that the Bible indicates and walk in 
them.” 
The “ancient paths … the good way” of the Bible text (Jer 6:16), on the one hand, 
become a fulfilled law (the ancient good paths that the forefathers walked) and, 
on the other hand, an unfulfilled law (the ancient good paths that the nation also 
must walk in their crises today). This legalistic foundation leads to the preacher 
saying: “Those who make this principle the foundation of his or her life and world 
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perspective, rise above the world and the sinful.” Apparently, the demand of the 
forefathers is inexorable: they demand unearthly and sinless followers, people 
who no longer can be counted as simul justus et peccator, but rise above it. 
When indeed sin is discussed, it is either in general or within the context of 
certain national ideals. Sin is conceived as the decline of the nation, as their 
failure to submit to their national existence and identity. Sin means no longer 
serving the “God of the fathers.” Sin is breaking the tradition. Sin is being 
disdainful of the myth.  
Therefore, the appeal for conversion and penance is mostly an appeal to return to 
a general, civil morality (cf. Bohren 1983:347). Robert Carrol (1991:35ff) is of the 
opinion that, in its most profound essence, fundamentalism is a protection of 
middle-class values. According to him, it is this ideology that “directs” the 
exegesis and the hermeneutics. Anything that comes into conflict with these 
values is regarded as sin; anybody who returns to these values is regarded as 
repentant. The result is that, ultimately, middle-class values become the final 
judge, the norm for the correct interpretation of God’s revealed will in the Bible 
(cf. also Deist 1990:133). In this sense, penance is conceived as otherwise pious 
people’s own active involvement in rectifying their moral shortcomings. In this 
way, God must be placated to ensure the nation’s future existence. The deeper-
lying faith behind this implies: the nation is better than others, because the nation 
is humbler and vice versa - because the nation is humbler, more obedient and 
conscientious than others are or were, God chose the nation. The implication of 
this is that God’s sovereignty, also to judge, is limited.  
A few sermons, indeed, link the threat to the nation with their own sin, and they 
even experience it as God’s judgement. The sermon based on Psalm 62:5, to 
which I referred in Chapter 2, for example, expresses it thus: 
“‘Find rest, O my soul, in God alone.’ This is the language of 
humiliation when the threats become serious and frightening. 
When the dark clouds gather, when downfall is imminent, it is 
human to panic and to doubt, to seek allies, or to make concessions. 
But, herein a nation’s salvation does not lie. When these events take 
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place, it is a time of humiliation for the people. Then, a nation must 
come to Christ with its doubt. It must become still before God. 
 
“And our nation must become still before God. A third of our 
nation has actually left God. For many the Word becomes a closed 
book. In the House of the Father their places are empty. Parents do 
not keep their baptismal vows. In our cities many sons and 
daughters live who are lost, and we already deal with lost children of 
lost parents. And, with the prophet, we must weep over the 
breaking of our sons and our daughters. 
 
“But the nation must deeply humiliate itself especially before God 
over its deedlessness. We silence our consciences by speaking of a 
silent majority. We must realise that all that a nation needs to break 
down is to remain silent when wrong things are propagated. God 
does not have mute children. Therefore, we must humiliate 
ourselves over our cowardly silence, our insensitive deedlessness, 
our cold carelessness. On the spiritual side, the desired new life is 
still lacking. In the field of art, decadence flourishes and people who 
maintain the norms of God’s Word do not confront it. On the social 
area, drugs, liquor and moral decline threaten us. On the economic 
terrain, experts must complain about methods that predict a 
nation’s downfall. On our roads, people die. God’s judgements 
repeatedly fall on our fatherland. 
 
“And we do not tremble before God. 
 
“There is reason for us to humiliate ourselves, to become silent 
before God. We have sinned. We must return to the God of our 
fathers.” 
The preacher points out that humiliation must take place “when the threat 
becomes serious and frightening,” etc. The threat becomes the reason for 
humiliation (cf. also, “Then a nation must…”). So an attempt is made to give the 
nation’s situation a theological meaning. This construction of “when … then” 
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implies that humiliation is not necessary otherwise. The reason for the 
humiliation is made parallel to the phenomenon of national decline (cf. “And our 
nation must become silent before God”). On the one hand, it is thus the external 
threat and, on the other hand, the internal national decline that are experienced 
simultaneously as “God’s judgement.” Sin is confessed (“We have sinned”), but 
this is conceived solely as a decline in national traditions and national religion. 
Conversion is a “return to the God of our fathers.” 
This and similar sermons with their proclamation of God’s judgement are 
exceptions that should be welcomed. After all, we need the judgement, because 
when God comes to us with his judgement, He simultaneously embraces us with 
his grace (Luther). Yet, it is clear that the idea of national unity and national 
totality still influences this proclamation fundamentally. The point of departure is 
still: in the past, the whole nation was with God and God was with the whole 
nation. That a part of the nation has left God is a greater crisis than the possibility 
that God has left the nation, or that He never was with the nation in the way in 
which the preacher believes. This proclamation of judgement is a national 
complaint about the condition of the nation rather than a proclamation of God’s 
judgement over all people and, as such, a proclamation of the need of God’s 
salvific grace for all people. In this national complaint there is still the idyllic 
notion that this nation is special and, therefore, must remain special – other than 
other nations. (For a parallel, cf. Richter-Böhne 1989:113). 
Therefore, the penance could also be understood at a different level. In the 1960s, 
but especially the 1970s, with the increasing isolation of South Africa, as well as 
the Dutch Reformed Church, an apocalyptic mentality developed (cf. Chapter 3), 
in which the “righteous” group (small as it was) conceived of itself as the true 
people of God and viewed all “onslaughts” as Godly purification, which implies 
not guilt, but a test. “He who perseveres will be saved.” Therefore, it is no longer 
necessary to speak about guilt, only about perseverance, because those who do 
not persevere become part of the people who are punished, become part of the 
enemy. 
However, in the majority of sermons, the link between the threat and God’s 
judgement is totally absent. In fact, they repudiate this link. The projection of guilt 
fulfils in this – as I interpret it – a second function: not only is it an act of self-
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justification, but it serves as an escape route out of God’s judgement - flight away 
from it. Sin, thus also God’s judgement, is left at the address of others. The nation 
is kept innocent and free of judgement. This is quite logical: because the doctrine 
of justification through grace is affected in its core (cf. Chapter 3), God is no 
longer proclaimed as the Coming Judge. In fact, any form of judgement over the 
nation, even only signs of it that could be interpreted as pointers towards the 
ultimate judgement in history, is suppressed. After all, the closed system of the 
myth cannot tolerate any external influences and may not be relativized, but itself 
must remain the norm for judgement. No critical distance may be allowed 
between God’s judgement and the myth. 
However, between justification, as understood in the biblical sense, and 
judgement there is an inseparable bond. Faith in justification, which is revealed in 
Christ, includes the expectation of the Coming Judge, of the judgement of the 
living and the dead. In this sense, justification is behind and ahead of us. The 
Gospel of Christ, the Crucified, simultaneously, is the Gospel of Christ, who is to 
come. Therefore, proclamation of judgement also belongs to the heart of the 
Gospel (Bohren 1974:251-254). 
In the sermons God is not only taken out of history and his current presence and 
work replaced with the presence and work of a people intact, but He is also taken 
out of the future. The sermons are in essence uneschatological. Christ will no 
longer come. People come. People must ensure the future. People take over the 
judgement –of others. 
This uneschatological character of the sermons finds its breeding-ground, inter 
alia, in its basic legalistic form. Because law and Gospel are not clearly distin-
guished, and the law is thus not proclaimed as God’s law, the radical perversion of 
the national myth and the need for radical (eschatological) change cannot be 
proclaimed clearly. On the contrary, the correct distinction of law and Gospel 
teaches us about what we hope for when we wait for the end of the world; it 
teaches us to truly yearn for liberation. Proclamation that takes this distinction 
seriously creates contradictions that provide content to our cry for the liberation 
of all things. In this way, the cry in our hearts for liberation becomes stronger, 
and it originates here, in this distinction, in the first place (Iwand 1964:217).  
The third hermeneutical step 
 
 75
Although, according to the sermons, the nation’s way of life is a reason for anxiety 
and complaint, its reparation and maintenance are left for the nation’s own 
account. The appeal to the nation for execution of the national ideal is regarded 
as the last (that is: eschatological) word. The view that the biblical imperatives are 
founded not only in the indicative of the salvific history, but are also supported by 
God’s salvific promises, is absent virtually throughout. Instead of the promissio 
Dei, the potentia populi rather applies. 
Like the creation of images (cf. Chapter 2), this is also a typical human reaction in 
times of fear.26 As a psychological phenomenon, anxiety is not as evident as, for 
example, the articulation of threat in the sermons, and yet, without doubt, it plays 
a decisive role. In a certain sense, it can even be regarded as the heuristic 
principle, as the factor that opens the mouths of preachers and forces the nation 
to listen with new attention. This determines the sermons’ foundational structure 
in the sense that everything possible is done to counteract anxiety. The one pole 
in the sermons is the detailed description of the threat; the other is the “solutions” 
that are presented. This takes place within the field of tension generated by the 
anxiety. 
One of the characteristics of anxiety is that it can cause a variety of reactions. For 
example, in situations of anxiety, defensive responses can be built up to protect 
one’s own existence. This can stretch from primitive reactions to nuanced 
mechanisms. A common phenomenon is that anxiety about guilt – or better: 
anxiety about the consequences of one’s own guilt – is replaced by anxiety about 
the impact of something external and threatening (Schulte 1957:222). Anxiety 
about guilt becomes anxiety about fate. This applies not only to individual 
behavioural patterns, but also to society. Collective guilt is suppressed by finding a 
communal external cause for the very circumstances in which those who are 
involved and responsible or co-responsible find themselves. With the assistance 
of social behavioural patterns, guilt is worked away and removed from the system 
(Mitscherlich 1967:21ff). However, in this way, anxiety may be replaced, but it is 
not removed. It continues to exert an influence, no matter how strenuous the 
                                                 
26 In this respect, I do not endorse the distinction that says that anxiety is without object, and that fear 
focuses on a specific object. In practice it is evident that this distinction is forced (cf. Schulte 
1957:220). 
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attempts to eliminate it. This is so because anxiety, most profoundly, is not 
created just through fear of others, but by looking at one’s own face (Schulte 
1957:222). 
In the sermons, the anxiety – I am trying to interpret it theologically – derives from 
the demasking of one’s own face, and thus from God’s own judgement. As such, it 
rests on a misunderstanding of the Gospel. Because, when God, being numinous, 
reveals Himself as God pro nobis, then He is feared (revered). Also, in his 
proximity to us, He is a mysterium tremendum et fascinosum, the incomparable, 
living God (cf. Chapter 2). However, this fear is totally different to the anxiety we 
have been speaking about. In my opinion, the human anxiety, characteristic of the 
sermons, is a result of the lack of fear of God. God’s love, after all, is revealed to us 
in this: He sent his only Son to the world so that we can attain life through Him. 
And where (this) love is, there is no fear (anxiety); perfect love drives out fear, 
because fear expects punishment, and those who still fear, do not have perfect 
love (1 Jh 4:9,18). True fear of God originates from and grows in the shadow of 
the One who came, and those shadows being cast by the coming One, and this is 
the right way in which one should preach about the present and coming One 
(Bohren 1974:262).  
Admitted, superficially anxiety seems like a significant factor. For example, it can 
be a powerful social manipulator that can be applied to keep the masses in check 
or to induce them to move, especially if it deals with a primeval anxiety about 
extinction (Schulte 1957:221-225). Yet anxiety is dangerous, even more dangerous 
than hatred. Appeals made on the basis of anxiety bring about little true change, 
but rather create a sensitivity about new anxieties. Ethical action manipulated 
through anxiety does not last long. On the contrary, it forms a destructive cycle 
that is extremely difficult to break. The anxiety that should have been exorcised 
becomes intensified. The longer the anxiety is kept alive, the more active it 
becomes, and the more it dims the view on reality and the possibility of co-
operating in the transformation of this reality. In this respect, anxiety is a faithful 
expression of the myth (cf. Chapter 2). Apparently it puts everything in operation 
to preserve life. And then loses it. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
As mentioned in the introduction, and as became evident repeatedly in the 
analyses, the sermons echo and articulate the Afrikaner nation’s experience of 
being threatened. There is a dramatic wrestling to preserve the existing traditions, 
to confirm and conserve the status quo. The preachers do everything possible to 
reach this comprehensive objective, with far-reaching consequences for the 
theological quality of the sermons. All the preachers suffer under a type of 
national theodicy and question God’s presence and involvement with the nation 
in its hour of crisis, and they try to solve this question moralistically (by means of 
appeals to people based on their abilities), instead of theologically. God pro nobis 
becomes God in nobis, and indeed in an anthroponomic and partitionomic 
conception and determination of the latter. People, a nation, must do what only 
God can do. In this way, the nation’s crisis, their asking about God, ends in 
legalism (cf. Landau 1991:17). The good intentions, i.e. the proclamation of 
justification by grace, become the proclamation of self-justification, or rather 
national justification. 
The tendency to implement Reformed and biblical concepts generously is 
significant, but frequently separate these concepts from their original contexts, 
abstract them and use them as key words and slogans for the ideal of national 
stability and national identity. So, for example, the Gospel becomes a national 
law, a religiously enhanced appeal to preserve the tradition. Jesus is transformed 
into an applicable medium in the service of patriotic moralism. The national 
history is surrounded with a radiance of holiness and becomes salvific history. For 
all practical purposes, nation and church are identical. God Himself becomes the 
personification of an idea, a mechanism by which national viewpoints are 
projected on a metaphysical level. God becomes nationalized. His freedom to be 
God, to choose and to reject, to be merciful and to judge, is thus curtailed. A 
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reduced number of God’s “characteristics” are presented, for example, that He 
“determines the destinies of nations,” or that He is the “Almighty,” etc. Other 
characteristics, such as his righteousness and his wrath, are avoided because it is 
problematic to fit them into the basic motif. Because these fall away, any 
opposition to the national vision is exclusively understood as the work of others, 
of the enemy. In this way, typically in national preaching of this nature, a loss of 
reality takes place in the sense that one’s own (sinful) reality, as it exists before 
God, is lost sight of (Pressel 1967:352; Marsch 1964:534). 
Preaching itself is misunderstood as a medium to realise and deepen certain 
national ideals. In my opinion, the analyses convincingly indicate this: preaching 
here no longer functions as an alternative, critical and therefore liberating word 
of God in the nation’s situation, but merely as a sanctioning and stabilizing word. 
The nation’s myth(s) thus take over the preaching to such an extent that the inner 
group’s convictions are confirmed and strengthened in their contrast to the 
external group. In this sense, these sermons are indeed a good reflected image of 
the society (cf. the Introduction); they form part of the public discourse that took 
place in this era in political, social, cultural and ecclesiastical debates. Apparently, 
these sermons, as speech events, are so embedded in the contemporary types of 
speech and content, and they are so determined by the (then) current social, 
economic and political clichés and rhetoric - in short, by the broader network of 
the social language of the day - that they are swallowed totally by them. In my 
opinion, the sermons do not escape the “sucking power” of certain national myths 
and did not succeed in having a renewing and transforming effect on society. On 
the contrary, the irony is this: the sermons want to unlock the Gospel for the 
situation; instead the Gospel is locked up in the situation. 
For this we must have some understanding. After all, we all live within contextual 
frameworks, with unilateral perspectives and exclusive myths. It is extremely 
difficult, even impossible, to step out of these frameworks and make “objective” 
and “neutral” judgements of them. Therefore, it must be said here: at least, these 
preachers still wrestled with the Bible, at least still asked about “God” within their 
framework. Only people in whom the Spirit works do this. Therefore, the 
contemporary generation of preachers must be critical of them as preaching 
fathers: but because they are our brothers we also accept them thus….  
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As is so often the experience with texts of this nature, the analyses had a dis-
illusioning effect on me. From time to time I despaired at the meaning and value 
of preaching as such. Could we ever break away from the isolation, from the hold 
of our myths? To this there is no easy answer. No recipe or “law” can guarantee 
this. Preaching remains a dangerous enterprise. However, we can at least be made 
aware of, and become sensitive to, the influences that have an effect on preaching. 
That is a beginning. 
We can learn – because it is a training process – to lose our first naivety about the 
interpretative event, to realise the relativity of all our interpretations, not trusting 
the validity of an exclusive one. The first step is indeed a hermeneutic of suspicion! 
(Ricoeur). As all language is a power play in service of ideology, whether 
conserving or innovating, an ideological-critical sensitizing process will have to 
be initiated, with an understanding of realities such as reception aesthetics, of the 
fact that all interpretations of texts are co-constitutive of the “meaning” of the 
text. 
Concepts such as “Word of God,” “authority of Scripture,” etc., must be placed 
within a critical and historical framework, so that they do not become “objects.” 
After all, a preacher stands amidst the dynamic flow of the biblical text itself, a 
process that implies that the text and its meanings are continuously “created,” 
and never simply “exist” (Brueggemann 1988:127). This process comprises the 
creative origin of the text and its reception by the preacher him-/herself, as well 
as by the congregation as audience of the sermon. This creative process is 
unavoidable; neither should one try to avoid it, because this is the way in which 
God’s Word lives in our midst. Therefore, our premises must frequently be 
questioned: what agendas, what “vested interests” are being served here 
(Brueggemann 1988:129)? Whose “story” enjoys preference? All this demands a 
greater level-headedness in preaching, as Brueggemann concludes: “Anyone who 
imagines that he or she is a benign or innocent preacher of the text is engaged in 
self-deception. Preaching as interpretation is always a daring, dangerous act in 
which the interpreter, together with the receivers of the interpretation, is 
consuming a text and producing a world” (1988:131-132). 
Therefore, one of the main tasks of homiletics is to change the innocent eye into a 
wide-awake eye, an eye that observes and investigates the shadowy depths of our 
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mythological worlds, and simultaneously is aware of its own distortions and blind 
spots (cf. Troeger 1988:209). So, it makes us aware of the interaction of 
interpretations, of the “stories” that live around the text, but also contributes to 
confront society’s current metaphors and to enrich them with the metaphors and 
stories of faith. This requires a hermeneutic at the interlevel between exegesis and 
social analysis, a hermeneutic that not only walks in the world and stories of the 
text, but also in the world and the stories of the concrete and specific social 
situation in which the congregation lives (cf. Müller 1992). Such a hermeneutic 
cannot function with a one-eyed glassy stare, but with imagination and fantasy 
(cf. Troeger 1988:211). After all, Scripture itself is an inexhaustible source of 
interpretative possibilities, the language of which is loaded with possibilities to 
break through the old patterns, the old stories and myths. In this respect, the 
hermeneutic of suspicion is not an objective in itself, but must lead and invite us 
to a journey of discovery, a journey in which the text helps us to discover new 
worlds, new dimensions, a journey full of wonderment, born out of a hermeneutic 
of suspicion that, simultaneously, is an enquiring hermeneutic, a hermeneutic full 
of fantasy. 
But, what do the contours of such a hermeneutic look like? In the light of the 
analyses, one could, for example, briefly say: 
~ That one must deal extremely carefully with salvific-historical analogies, 
especially when these analogies are implemented to justify historical or 
current situations, or to deify them (cf. Marsch 1964:533). The Gospel rather 
demythologizes reality, as the reality before God. 
~ That the tendency to categorize people in exclusive compartments of “good” 
and “bad,” or “predestined” and “evil,” with the concomitant projection of 
guilt from oneself to others, must be discerned and replaced with the 
language of being associated with guilt. As for example, in the language of the 
dying son, Markel, in Dostoevsky’s novel, The brothers Karamasov, when he 
says to his mother: “Before everyone, we are guilty in everything, and I more 
than everybody.”  
~ That the claim that I, or we, are in possession of the absolute truth must 
make room for a wider vision, openness to the multifacetedness of the truth. 
The self-appropriation of ontological authority and divine indisputability 
Conclusion 
 
 81
must not only cause hermeneutical alarm-bells to ring, but must be 
confronted and revealed in its true essence: as power-speech in the service of 
ideology. 
~ That any relation of domination that is perpetuated by language must be 
brought to the light ideologically-critically, by especially noting the tendency 
of ideologies to conceal themselves so in language that one’s own guilt 
remains hidden away. In short, the destructive and dehumanizing elements of 
myths must be distinguished timeously (cf. Adonis/Smit 1991:28-30 on the 
analysis conducted by Grabner-Haider). 
But how? By returning to the Word with openness to its inexhaustible 
possibilities of interpretation. Yes. But saying that we must return to the Word 
alone is not enough. We often read the Word just to strengthen our convictions. 
This is our dilemma. The problem of the South African society during the 
apartheid era was indeed the fact that our great variety (ethnic, cultural, political, 
social) had degenerated into a sinful partitioning, also in the church. A pattern of 
separation was established. Churches and groups read and proclaimed Scripture 
from their own experience and perception of the South African reality, often from 
directly opposite world views, with conflicting interpretative frameworks, 
perspectives, collective “stories” and myths. This problem was aggravated by the 
fixed conviction of such churches and groups that they did not, or did not wish to, 
proclaim anything but Scripture. The tragedy was that people, with the same 
Bible in their hands, and with the same Name of God on their lips, attacked each 
other by hand and mouth; that people said, or in any case subconsciously 
believed, that God is “for us” and “against the others.” 
We recently celebrated our democracy’s tenth anniversary. We have come a long 
way since the dark days of apartheid. But it would be naïve to think that the 
history and culture of separation have been eradicated fully from our society and 
churches. On the contrary, we must be continually liberated from this. In my 
opinion, such a liberation can indeed take place, and particularly within the space 
of the ecumene, of the church in the broadest sense of the word. After all, the 
church as una sancta catholica, is God’s gift to us; it is not the fruit of our hard 
work and is not dependent on our potential. The church is not based in our 
“wealth,” which, in reality, is poverty, but in the wealth of Christ. That is his body, 
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the fullness (pleroma) of Him who fulfils everything in everybody (Eph 1:23). 
Within this community there are enriching and controlling powers active like 
nowhere else. Here, we can continue to hear other voices, the voices of our 
brothers and sisters, their suffering under, and interpretation of, reality, their 
despair and hope. Here our myths can be relativized, revealed as precisely what 
they are: human-made constructions for our own prosperity. Here, in the creative 
co-operation of many interpretative models, unilateral fixations and omnipotent 
fantasies can be brought to light. Where there are two or three, the anxiety about 
each other, and about one’s own face, is already half-conquered! Truly, we need 
each other, more than what we think or would admit. After all, the word of Christ 
in the mouth of my brother and sister is worth more than the word of Christ in 
my heart! (Bonhoeffer). 
Thus, what I plead for is a continual ecumenical hermeneutic. If the church in 
South Africa still wants to play a role in the pastoral guidance and social therapy 
of a wounded society on the road to transformation and healing, then its rhetoric 
must also be liberated from its cultic restrictiveness and mythical sectarianism, to 
render a contribution outside the small circle that it serves over and over. In my 
opinion, the study of preaching offers a helpful point of departure in this regard. 
It provides an insight into the origin and development of historical and 
contemporary religious myths, and offers a wide and, simultaneously, a compara-
ble data basis. It can contribute to greater understanding of the present 
philosophy and actions of others, by examining and assessing their theological 
and homiletical background and formation. It can especially stimulate discourse 
on the task of the church and the role of proclamation in a time of transition. It 
can lead to a better understanding of the identity of one’s own faith community 
and that of the broader church, so that it can indeed play a meaningful role in the 
social context in which the faith community breathes, i.e. also in terms of the 
myths, symbols, stories, cultural perspectives and symbolic universums within 
which the greater community lives (Müller 1992:4). 
How must all of this take place in practice? Who can initiate such a mutual 
listening to the proclamation of the church? Who, in our society with its history 
of separation, has the necessary integrity for this? I do not know. In any case, it 
will probably be a difficult process, a process that will require much maturity 
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from all. The monoculture of churches, which even now still penetrates into 
theological training and communal life, will have to be replaced with a new 
culture, a new spirit of unity and a search for unity, a spirit in which the “hostile 
imagination” will have to make room for a “communal imagination” (Troeger 
1988:208-218). Because it is especially within the creative play of the ecumene 
that a hermeneutic of fantasy can grow, where we can learn and see concretely in 
the lives of our brothers and sisters that Scripture does not provide simple 
answers to our existential and socio-political questions - but an arsenal of 
possibilities (Deist 1991:379); that God’s will is not locked up in the Bible, theo-
logy or in tradition, as in an archive of certainties, but that God’s will, indeed, 
must be sought, namely in the community of believers with their divergent 
opinions. We need precisely an alternative to our opinion if we want to come 
closer to the truth (Deist 1991:379). After all, God reveals Himself in the so-called 
contradictions of history. “Certainties on what we must think of God in our own 
time, we do not have. We only have the contradictions of our history, the biblical 
map and … each other. What the Bible ensures us of is that God is present among 
us and that we need the testimony of rich and poor, slave and free man, man and 
woman, Jew and Greek if we want to recognize Him in this maelstrom” (Deist 
1991:380). 
It demands from us a deeper awareness of our own vulnerability, greater humility, 
a more intense spirit of ecumenicity, and … confession of guilt. Within the school 
of the ecumene, it is difficult to suffer from collective or selective amnesia! The 
one reminds the other of unknown and unconfessed guilt. Without the 
ecumenical corrective, our (lack of) memory of past guilt often is nothing but a 
group-fabricated system of lies. However, in the broader community of believers, 
the possibility exists to confess guilt honestly to each other and to pray for each 
other, so that healing of a disrupted society can take place (cf. Jas 5:16). Within 
the ecumene there is a greater chance for conversion, to see and experience the 
movement and course of the Spirit - towards the ends of the earth and time, and 
the coming of Christ…. 
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Günter Bublitz tells27 how he cycled one morning to meditate on the text about 
which he would preach the following Sunday. After a few metres he discovered 
that he was having difficulty in pedalling, that his outing was less pleasant that he 
had anticipated. He started perspiring. All pious thoughts about the text 
disappeared from his mind. He could only concentrate on the road before him. 
However, when Bublitz turned back, the situation changed: he could ride with the 
wind! With the power of the wind behind him, peace and reflection returned …. 
The Spirit works. He blows so in the una sancta catholica that we frequently are 
brought into movement – in the right direction. Not towards new myths that 
probably will be created by new anxieties in a changed society, not to struggle 
against the wind of new exhausting and destructive powers, but to direct us to the 
living God of the one holy and catholic church. In this church the Spirit works so 
through our prayers, community and confession that we are made aware of the 
Gospel’s realities and promises. Here we learn: in spite of our myths, God always 
still is God; in spite of our images, He always is the Living; in spite of our 
resistance to Him, He always still is: God for us. 
                                                 
27 In a personal correspondence with Gerd Debus. 
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reaching reveals, amongst other things, the state of the heart
of the church – whether it be healthy or ailing. Sermons from
the South African apartheid era, taken from the official mouthpiece
of the Dutch Reformed Church (Die Kerkbode), as preached during the
years 1960 to 1980 reveal a church sickened by an ideology that had
a devastating effect on the country as a whole. In this book, these
sermons are analyzed in depth, following a method of “close reading”
that not only takes the linguistic detail of each sermon very seriously,
but also the theological perspectives conveyed by these details. These
analyses bring to light the way preachers made use of biblical texts to
sanction national ideals, to create and perpetuate selective God-images,
and to stabilize a certain identity during a time of crises. It is saddening
and shocking to read and relive these sermons, even after 12 years of
democracy in South Africa. But it must not be erased from our memory
too quickly. The church cannot do without remembrance. It watches
over the state of her heart.
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